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important practical issue as well. All other things being equal, informed taxpayers seek to accelerate deductions and to defer the
inclusion of income.4 On an issue of such importance, one expects
the Supreme Court, when it exercises its discretionary jurisdiction
twice within such a short period of time, to promulgate well-crafted,
thoughtful opinions.
But the Court wrote as neither craftsman nor theoretician. The
cases apply the same prong of the "all events" test, which addresses
the timing issue. 5 Nevertheless, the cases fit together poorly, if at
all, and the Court's attempted reconciliation reflects an analysis made
at the most mundane conceptual level. Moreover, the two decisions
are of surprisingly limited scope. The. Tax Reform Act of 1984

Jensen, The Deduction of Future Liabilities by Accrual-Basis Taxpayers: Premature
Accruals, the All Events Test, and Economic Performance, 37 U. FLA. L. REv.
443 (1985); Johnson, Silk Purses from a Sow's Ear: Cost Free Liabilities Under
the Income Tax, 3 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y 231 (1984); Lokken, The Time Value of
Money Rules, 42 TAX L. REv. 1 (1986); McMahon, Reforming Cost Recovery
Allowances for Debt Financed Depreciable Property, 29 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 1029
(1985); Note, Salvaging Accrual Method Deductions: Adding a "Time Value of
Money" Component to the "All Events" Test, 40 TAX LAw. 185 (1986).
• The taxpayer desires to pay taxes later rather than sooner. See M. CHIREL·
INCOMe TAXATION 5 (4th ed. 198,5). A tax bill of $x to .be paid
next year is, in present value terms, less of an obligation than a tax hill of $x
to be paid today. Thus, all other things being equal, a one-dollar deduction that
currently offsets otherwise taxable income is, from the taxpayer's perspective,
preferable to a one-dollar deduction to be taken only in a future taxable year.
See Bradley & Winslow, Self-Insurance Plans and Captive Insurance Companies
- A Perspective on Recent Tax Developments, 4 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y 217, 230
(198.5). Of course, if all other things are not equal, this general proposition may
not hold true. For example, if the taxpayer expects to be subject to taxation at
a much higher marginal rate in the next taxable year, deferring a deduction into
that year, thereby offsetting income that would otherwise be taxed at the higher
rate, may be beneficial.
Today every law student taking the basic course in federal income taxation
gains at least some rudimentary idea about the importance of the time value of
money. However, theoretical sophistication in this area is a relatively recent phenomenon, and Congress has only in this decade begun to incorporate time value
concepts into the Internal Revenue Code. Professor Surrey, noting that economist
B. Cary Brown had been credited with "discovering" the deferral effects of accelerated !lepreciation in 1948, commented that "perhaps a Congressman can be
pardoned for not appreciating the benefit of deferral if its ramifications apparently
eluded public finance specialists for 35 years of our income tax history." S.
SuJUrnY, PATHWAYs TO TAX REFoRM 123 (1973) (citing the reference to Brown in
C, SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 302 n:20 (1969)).
s See infra notes 13·17 and ·accompanying text.
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substantially modified the law governing the timing of deductions, 6
but neither case involved facts governed by the new statute. 7 Finally,
in the cursory majority opinion in General Dynamics, the Court
made a misleading suggestion about the law after the Tax Reform
Act of 1984 and advanced an ill-considered proposition about the
construction of tax statutes. Indeed, the opinion evidences an astonishing lack of both research and analysis. 8 Shoddy judicial work
warrants criticism for its own sake, and criticism is particularly justified when the Supreme Court misreads, and therefore possibly misdirects, post-1984 Act law.
Section I of this article outlines the "all events" test and describes
the procedural history of Hughes Properties and General Dynamics. 9
Section II critically examines the formalistic basis for the inconsistent
resolutions of the two cases. 10 Section III discusses the changes made
by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 that affect the timing of deductions
and responds to the Supreme Court's suggestion about the effect of
those changes upon a factual situation like that of General Dynamics.U Finally, section IV considers the use in General Dynamics of
insurance company taxation principles outside the insurance company

6 Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(a), 98 Stat. 494, 598-600 (1984) (adding new I.R.C.
§ 461(h)). See Jensen, supra note 3, at 477-89; infra notes 102-15 and accompany-

,
ing text.
7
Nevertheless, the long audit periods of large corporations make interpretations of former law significant for a 'substantial number of taxpayers. For some
ruminations about why the Court might have granted certiorari in the wake of
the statutory changes, see Jensen, Hughes Properties and General Dynamics: The
Supreme Court, the All Events Test, and the 1984 Tax Act, 32 TAX NoTES 911,
911-12 (1986).
8 See infra notes 120-60 & 165-92 and accompanying text. Perhaps the lack of
research and analysis is not so astonishing. In commenting on Court assignments to
draft opinions, Justice Harry Blackmun noted, "If one's in the doghouse with the
Chief [Justice], he gets the crud. He gets the tax cases, and some of the Indian
cases, which I like but I've had a lot of them." Taylor, Reading the Tea Leaves of
a New Term, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1986, at B14, col. 6. Blackmun's comment
appears to reflect a general sentiment among the Justices. See B. WooDWARD & S.
ARMsTRONG, THE BRETHREN 362 (1980) (" 'This is a tax case. Deny.' That was
Brennan's normal reaction to a [certiorari] request in a tax case."); Taylor, Powell
on His Approach: Doing Justice Case by Case, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1987, at A18,
col. 3 (quoting Justice Powell: "A dog is a case that you wish the Chief Justice
had assigned to some other Justice[,] . . . a tax case, for example").
9 See infra notes 13-46 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 47-101 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 102-60 and accompanying text.
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context.
IV also joins the debate over whether additions to
accounting
should ever be deductible without specific stati
utory autl;lQrity .'2
J"'___

I.

j

A.

,

;TEST, Hughes Properties, AND General
I Dynamics
Events Tes1

'f!:q!ALL EVENTS

ua.~.-u£"""

taxpayer 13 generally need not wait until a liability
or othe~se satisfied in order to deduct the amount

12
See infra notes 161-208 and accompanying text.
" The Internal Revenue Code generally requires a taxpayer to compute taxable
income under the same method of accounting that it regularly uses for financial
. accounting. I.R.C. § 446(a). "Method of accounting," for this purpose, includes
overall methods. of accounting such as the cash receipts and disbursements method,
an accrual method, some combination of the two, or one of the other methods
permitted by Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c). Taxpayers that are required to use inventories for a 'particular trade or business must generally use an accrual method of
accounting for their purchases and sales, Treas. Reg. § l.446-l(c)(2)(i), and in~
ventories ar~ required in all cases in which the production, purchase, or sale of
merchandis~is an income-producing factor. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1. Moreover,
I.R.C. § 448, added by TaxReform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 801(a),
100 StaL zqss, 2345, generally forbids certain organizations (C corporations, partnerships with C corporation~ as partners, and tax shelters) from using the cash
receipts an4 disbursements method.
Accrual principles have been described in the following way:
(1) Revenues are recognized as entering i:nto the determination of
income when sales are made or services are rendered.
(2) The mere receipt of money or the promise of another person to
pay money for the· goods or services does .not represent revenue. which
should be recognized in the period of receipt if it is burdened with
an obligation to deliver goods or render services in the future. Items
of this nature are treated as resulting in liabilities or deferred credits
until they are earned through the fulfillment of the required performances.
(3) Costs and expenses directly· identifiable with revenues are chargeable against the income of the period in which the revenues are recognized. Expenses, such as insurance, rent, property taxes and interest,
which .are for particular periods of time are chargeable over such
periods. Other expenses incurred in the general conduct of the business
are chargeable against the income of the period in Which they are
incurred unless it is clearly evident that they are for the benefit of
futu~e periods and there is a reasonable basis, both as to amount and
time, for allocating them to future periods, in which event they should
be deferred and charged to such periods.
(4) If the precise amount of any costs or expenses is not determinable at the time they are chargeable against income, they should be
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of the obligation. Traditional timing principles-those in effect prior
to modification by the Tax Reform Act of 1984-permitted a deduction when a ·liability had been ''incurred,'' that is, when the two
requirements of the all events test had been met. 14
Under the Treasury regulations that set out the test, a taxpayer
subject to the pre-1984 Act rules (such as the taxpayers in Hughes.
Properties and General Dynamics) must demonstrate that "all the
events have occurred which determine the fact of the liability'' and
that "the amount thereof can be demonstrated with reasonable accuracy."15 To show the fact of the liability, the taxpayer must in
general demonstrate the absence of contingencies (other than the
obligor's ability to pay) that could defeat the liability. 16 To show
the amount of the liability, the taxpayer must provide more than a
rough estimate, although absolute precision is not necessary .17
In both Hughes Properties and General Dynamics, the Internal
Revenue Service contended that, in the taxable years in question,
the taxpayers had not met the requirements of the ·all events test
with respect. to certain claimed deductions, and that the deductions

recognized on the basis of reasonable estimates.
(5) Accounting recognition of costs and expenses which cannot be
determined with a reasonable degree of accuracy at the time they
would otherwise be charged against income of a particular period
should be deferred until such determination is possible.
Stanger, Vander Kam, & Polifka, Prepaid Income and Estimated Expenses: Financial Accounting Versus Tax Accounting Dichotomy, 33 TAX LAw. 403, 405
(1980).
.
4
'
This article considers only timing issues, that is, the proper taxable year for
a deduction to be taken. It is assumed that statutory authority (such as LR.C. §
162, see infra note 27) exists for any deduction. ·
" Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(2).
16
See, e.g., Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. J93 (1934), described in the text at
infra note 164 and accompanying text. See also Jensen, supra note 3, at 453-54
(discussing Brown).
Although the taxpayer must in general show the absence of contingencies, the
test does not require absolute certainty. Contingencies of some sort always exist
until satisfaction of the liability (such as by payment). The cases have phrased
the issue in terms of the absence of contingencies, but the underlying question
appears to be "How contingent is too contingent?". See Jensen, supra note 3, at
455-56; Bradley & Winslow, supra note 4, at 227 n.36.
17
See Jensen, supra note 3, at 462-67; see generally Comment, Accrual and
Unusual Punishment-:-The Reasonable Accuracy Requirement of the All Events
Test, 25 UCLA L. REv. 70 (1977).

~
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were therefore improper in those years. 18 The Service challenged timing only-not the taxpayers' rights to deduct the amounts in issue
at some point-but fortunes have been won and lost as a result of
disputes involving "only" timing.

B. Hughes Properties: Casino's Liability to Pay Slot Machine
Progressive Jackpots 19
Hughes Properties, Inc. (Hughes), an accrual-basis taxpayer, owned
a Nevada gambling casino. The casino included several special slot
machines that provided for "progressive" jackpots, jackpots that
increased over time, based on the amount of machine usage, until
either the jackpots were won or maximum figures were reached.
Each progressive slot machine had a ''payoff indicator" that
showed casino, customers the current level of the jackpot, and the
indicator figure at any time represented a guaranteed minimum jackpot. Strictly-enforced Nevada Gaming Regulations forbade turning
back the indicator to a lesser amount except on payout to a winning
player or upon machine malfunction. 20 Moreover, if a machine was
to be taken out of service, the Nevada Gaming Commission required
either that the machine be played until payoff or that the unpaid
jackpot liability be transferred to another machine that continued in
service. 21
Gaming Regulations required that every progressive jackpot that
was won be paid. Any casino that wrongfully refused to pay a
guaranteed jackpot to a winning customer faced potentially severe
administrative sanctions, including license revocatioil. 22 In addition,
since 1977, the last year at issue in Hughes Properties, the Gaming
Commission has required casinos to maintain cash reserves sufficient

United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 597, 601 (1986);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (1987).
9
'
The description of the facts of Hughes Properties is taken from my earlier
article, Jensen, supra note 7, at 913-14.
20
Nev. Gaming Regs. § 5.110.2 (1972).
21
Joint Appendix, United States v. Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. 593 (1986)
(No. 85-554) (affidavit of Peter Echeverria, member of Nevada Gaming Commission). The jackpot obligation did not disappear if a casino .sold its entire business.
The Commission required the buyer to continue the progressive machines in play
with initial jackpots no smaller than those on the machines at the time of sale.
!d.
22
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 463.310 (Michie 1986).
18
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to pay the guaranteed amounts on their progressive machines. 23
The average period between payoffs for most of the casino's progressive machines was 4-1/2 months, although the periods varied
greatly, ranging from a low of 1.9 months to a high of 14.3 months.
Two of the twenty-four machines had been in operation for extended
periods (13 and 35 months) with no payoff, 24 but it was understood
that all machines possessed a real possibility of payoff and that
Nevada law required that there be such a possibility. 25
At the end of each taxable year, Hughes calculated the sum of
the payoff indicator amounts for all progressive machines. From that
figure, Hughes subtracted the equivalent figure. that had been computed at the end of the prior year. Hughes treated the increase in
the future payoff liability26 as a deductible ordinary and necessary
business expense. 27
The Internal Revenue Service agreed that Hughes, through use of
the payoff indicator figures, had demonstrated the amount of liability with reasonable accuracy. 28 The Commissioner contended, how~
ever, that. the fact of the liability with respect to each slot machine
occurred only upon a winner's pull of that machine's handle, 29 The
. Commissioner had successfully employed such an argument in a similar case involving another Nevada casino, Nightingale v. United
States, 30 where the Ninth Circuit concluded:
The one, indispensable . . ~ event is the winning of the
. progressive jackpot by some fortunate gambler.... Gambling being what it is, and gambling odds being what they
are, it is entirely possible that no actual liability wiU ever
occur. . . . [T]here is no way of knowing when any par- ·

Nev. Gaming Regs. § 5.110.3 (1977).
Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 5% n.l.
2s !d. at 595-96. In fact, all jackpots unpaid as of the end of the last taxable
year in issue were subsequently won. /d. at 602 n.3.
16
For example, if a machine showed progressive jackpots of $1,000 at the
beginning of the year and $5,000 at the end of the year, Hughes would have
treated $4,000 as the deductible amount attributable to that machine.
27
· The Internal Revenue Code permits the deduction of "ordinary and necessary
expenses ... incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." I.R.C. § 162(a).
28 Brief for the United States at 13, Hughes Properties (No. 85-554).
"' Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 597.
30
684 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1982).
23

24
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ticular progressive "one armed bandif' will pay off, nor
what the amount of that payoff will then be. 31
In spite of Nightingale, both the Claims Court32 and the Federal
Circuit33 held for Hughes, viewing the liability as fixed by Nevada
law at midnight on the last day of the fiscal year. The courts
concluded that the casino satisfied the all events test upon the final
play of the machine before year's end, "that is, the last change in
the jackpot amount before the amount is recorded for accounting
purposes.'' 34 With the conflict between the Ninth and Federal Circuits, the government petitioned for certiorari.

C. General Dynamics: Employer's Self-Insurance Liability to Reimburse Employees' Medical Expenses3 5
Collective bargaining agreements required General Dynamics and
its affiliated corporations (collectively, GD) to maintain health insurance coverage for GD employees. In 1972, GD, which had previously funded plans through private insurance carriers, took over
the insurance function itself. 36 GD established reserves to meet its
estimated liability and retained the two insurance firms that had
earlier provided coverage to evaluate and approve benefit claims. On
its tax return for 1972, GD deducted its liability for medical services
assumed to have been performed during the year as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. Thus, GD deducted not only its 'liability
for those employees whose claims had been approved during the
year, but also its estimated liability for claims during the year that

'' Id. at 614.
32 . Hughes Properties, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 641, 645 (1984).
33 Hughes Properties, Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 1292, 1293 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
34
5 Cl. Ct. at 645; 760 F.2d at 1293.
35 The description of the facts of General Dynamics is taken from Jensen,
supra note 7, at 918-20.
36 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732, 1734-35 (1987).
That is, GD took over the obligation to reimburse employees for medical expenses
covered under the plan; GD was therefore providing insurance for its employees.
Although the new arrangement was called "self-insurance," from GD's perspective
it technically was npt insurance at all because GD shifted none of its own risk
to another, unrelated party. See Barker, Federal Income Taxation and Captive
Insurance, 6 VA. TAX REv. 267, 280 (1986); Crane, Anticipation and the Accrual
Method Revisited, 1986-87 PREVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT. CASES
281, 282 (1987).
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had either not yet been filed, or, if filed, had not yet been approvedY
The Commissioner denied the deductions for the estimates, 38 even
though the estimates were based on the actuarial principles used by
the insurance industry for determining such "incurred but not reported,. (IBNR) claims. 39 The Commissioner contended that a deduction should not be permitted until a plan administrator had
approved a claim. Until such approval, GD could not establish a
liability in fact because either an employee might not file a claim
or the administrator might deny the claim. 40 In the government's
view, then, any deduction permitted would be with respect to "expenses that [GD] may never incur at all." 41

" General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1734-35. GD did not deduct any part of
the self-insurance reserves on its original return. Upon commencement of an Internal Revenue Service audit, however, GD filed an amended return and claimed
a deduction for the additions to the reserves. /d. at 1735.
The deductibility of premiums actually paid to the insurance companies by GD
in prior taxable years was appropriately not at issue. But taxpayers have been
imaginative in seeking to obtain deductions for arrangements, such as self-insurance or premium "payments" to captive insurance companies, that do not result
in relinquishing control over the deducted funds. See generally Barker, supra note
36; Bradley & Winslow, supra note 4. As a result, the Internal Revenue Service
has vigorously challenged deductibility under such plans.
n Under the all events test, there was no dispute over deductibility of those
claims already approved but not yet paid. The absence of dispute demonstrates
the all events test's failure to take account of the time value of money. If payment
is delayed for any significant amount of time after deduction of the liability, the
taxpayer may receive a sizeable economic benefit from the accelerated deduction.
See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
39
Under the guidance of its insurance company administrators, GD followed
actuarial principles, but it did not claim to be an "insurance company" entitled
for that reason to deduct additions to reserves. See I.R.C. § 807 (permitting
deduction for additions to reserves by life insurance companies); LR.C. § 832(b)(5)
(permitting deduction for additions to reserves by non-life insurance companies);
infra notes 165-92 and accompanying text.
40
The administrator was required to determine "whether the medical procedures
were covered by the health plans, whether stipulated maximum charges had been
exceeded, and whether the treatment was medically necessary." Supplemental
Memorandum for the United States at 2, United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732 (1987) (No. 85-1385). About 90% of the amounts for
which GD's employees claimed reimbursement had historically been approved for
payment. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 6 CI. Ct. 250, 254 (1984).
41 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, General Dynamics (No. 85-1385). See
also Brief for United States at ll, General Dynamics (No. 85-1385):
It is t:tue that [GD, once medic.al services have been provided to an
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GD prevailed at both the Claims Court'2 and Federal Circuit43
levels. Those courts held that the last event necessary to fix liability
was the "occurrence of the insured event, " 44 that is, the provision
of medical services. Although the lower courts had ruled against the .
government with respect to both prongs of the all events test,45 the
government limited its petition for Supreme Court review to the
"fact of liabilitylt question. 46
H.

THE SUPREME COURT . DECISIONS

A. Applying the First Prong of the All Events Test: Imagining
Contingencies
As presented to the Supreme Coutt, both Hughes Properties and

General Dynamics invofved only one ultimate question: when can a
taxpayer successfully demonstrate the fact of a liability, the first
prong of the all events test? The government did not question in
either case the "reasonable accuracy" of the amount claimed as a

employee,] . . . reasonably can anticipate that it will have a future
obligation to reimburse the employee if he files a Claim and his claim
is approved. But this anticipated obligation is no more certain than
the future liability that [OD] could have anticipated at the time it
originally entered into the collective bargaining agreements under which
the health plans were created.
2
'
General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 250 (1984) .
•, General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 773 F.2d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
44
6 Cl. Ct. at 255 (emphasis in original deleted); 773 F.2d at· 1225.
"' The lower courts viewed the estimate for taxable year 1972 as reasonably
accurate even though the company later paid only 82.2!1Jo of the reserved amount
for claims. 6 Cl. Ct. at 256; 773 F.2d at 1226.
46
The government did not agree with the lower court's ruling on the amount
of liability because of the discrepancy of nearly 2007o between amounts deducted
and amounts ultimately paid. See supra note 45. However, it abandoned the issue
in this case because of the difficulty of overturning a fundamentally factual determination on appeal. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13 n.2, General Dynamics
(No, 85-1385); Brief for United States at 33 n.lO, General Dynamics (No. 851385).
General Dynamics would have been a particularly good case for the Court to
hear on the amount of liability if that issue had been necessary to the Court's
resolution of the case. An overestimation of liabilities can provide a substantial
economic benefit to a taxpayer permitted an accelerated deduction. See Jensen,
supra note 3, at 466-67 (discussing treatment of overestimates); infra notes 84-93
and accompanying text (suggesting General Dynamics necessarily implicated reasonable accuracy question).
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deduction. The government conceded that point at the outset in
Hughes Properties, and it limited its petition for certiorari to the
fact of liability issue in General Dynamics.
In Hughes Properties, the Court ruled for the taxpayer. By a
7-2 vote, 47 the Court held that the obligation imposed by the
Nevada statute and regulations fixed a liability in fact at the end
of the casino's taxable year. The casino had therefore properly
deducted each year's aggregate increase in the payoff indicator
levels. In reaching that conclusion, the Court resolved a number
of issues that had puzzled lower courts and commentators prior
to the Tax Reform Act of 1984. For example, the Court held
that an obligation under state law can fix a liability prior to the
performance that satisfies the liability. 48 Moreover, a liability can
be fixed even though both the ultimate payee49 and the time of

41
Justice Blackmun authored the opinion joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice Stevens's dissent was joined
by Chief Justice Burger.
48
"[A]s a matter of state law, [Hughes] had a fixed liability for the jackpot
which it could not escape." United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U.S.
593, 602 (1986). This issue had been important, for example, in cases involving
statutorily mandated reclamation obligations associated with strip mining. See,
e.g., Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1369, 1374 (1981) (holding
that state statute fixed, in year land was disturbed, strip miner's obligation to
reclaim mined land); see also Jensen, supra note 3, at 455-61 (discussing Ohio
River Collieries); Note, Ohio River Collieries v. Commissioner: Satisfying the Fixed
Liability Requirement Through a Statutory Duty to Act, 3 VA. TAX REV. 215
(1983). In Ohio River Collieries, the reasonable accuracy of the future reclamation
obligation had been stipulated, and the taxpayer was permitted a current deduction
for the undiscounted amount of the reclamation obligation to be fulfilled in
subsequent taxable years. See also I.R.C. § 468, as amended by Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1807(a)(3)(A), 1807(a)(3)(C), 1899A(14), 100 Stat.
2085, 2811, 2959 (1984 Act addition setting out special rules for certain future
mining reclamation costs).
49 "The obligation is there, and whether it turns out that the winner is one
patron or another makes no conceivable difference as to basic liability." Hughes
Properties, 476 U.S. at 602. The Service had argued in many cases, generally
unsuccessfully, that a liability was necessarily contingent until some person exists
who can assert a claim against the taxpayer. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
United States; 717 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1983) (permitting current. deduction to
cover uncontested liabilities, under worker's compensation laws, arising from injuries to employees); Washington Post Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1279 (Ct.
Cl. 1969) (permitting current deduction of accrued, but unpaid, contributions to
newspaper dealer profit-sharing plan); Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Comm'r, 77
T.C. 1369 (1981) (permitting current deduction for future strip mining reclamation
obligation even though identity of party to perform reclamation was unknown).
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payment50 may be unknown. Finally, the Court determined that
a liability can be fixed even though the obligor may be able to
avoid payment through its own voluntary acts, such as surrendering its license or filing for bankruptcy, as long as those possibilities are remote. 51
Although generous to the taxpayer in many respects, particularly
in its disregard of time value of money considerations, 52 the decision in Hughes Properties was seen as a reasonable accommodation
of the "competing interests in permitting accrual accounting and
protecting the public fisc." 53 In Hughes Properties the Court seemed
to take a step in the direction of predictability of result for those

'" On the timing issue, the Court simply stated that "only the exact time of
payment and the identity of the winner remained for the future." Hughes Properties, 476 U:S. at 604. In an aside, the Court noted that the government's brief
"speaks of the time value of money," id., but it rejected that issue as a serious
one on these facts. /d, ("since the casino of course must pay taxes on the income
it earns from the use of as-yet-unwon jackpots, the Government vastly overestimates the time value of [Hughes') deductions"). But see infra notes 94-101 and
accompanying text (arguing that the time value of money is the issue in such
cases).
A simple example will illustrate the importance of the timing question. Assume
that a gambling concern collects $100 in wagers in year one, all of which it is
committed (unrealistically) to pay out in winnings, but· not until year two. In year
two, the concern will collect another $100, to be paid out the following year, and
so on. If the taxpayer is permitted a $100 deduction in each year, reflecting its
future obligations, it will never have net income from gambling. Its only taxable
income will be the investment income earned on the as-yet-unpaid jackpots. If the
taxpayer is not permitted the $100 deduction in year one, however, it will have
to pay taxes for that year on the full $100. (If the applicable marginal rate is
460Jo, only $54 will remain after taxes.) As in the first case, the net gambling
income in future years is zero, and the taxpayer will have to pay taxes on
investment income earned on the reserved amounts. But· the $46 paid in taxes on
the first year's gambling income is gone, and the taxpayer. loses forever the
earnings on that amount.
51 "The existence of an absolute liability is necessary; absolute certainty that it
will be discharged by payment is not." Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 606 (quoting Helvering v. Russian Fin. & Constr. Corp., 77 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1935)).
The Court suggested that the inclusionary tax benefit rule would require the later
inclusion of any amounts deducted that were not, in fact, paid. Hughes Properties,
476 U.S. at 605 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(2)). The Court ignored the fact
that the tax benefit rule does not take account of the time value of money. See
Jensen, supra note 7, at 915 n.48.
52
See supra note 50; infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
53
E.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732, 1740 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).

1988]

TIMING OF DEDUCTIONS

cases controlled by the all events test, a step that led at least one
commentator to predict a victory for the taxpayer in General Dy-

namics.54
The prediction was wrong. 55 Instead, by a 6-3 margin, 56 the Court
concluded in General Dynamics that an employer's medical reimbursement liability would not be fixed until an employee filed a
health expense benefits claim formY The Court stopped short of
fully accepting the government's proffered theory that both filing
and approval of a claim should be necessary to satisfy the all
events test. 58 But the decision nevertheless effectively constituted a
total defeat for the taxpayer because GD lost more than its deduction for amounts reflecting claims not yet filed. GD failed to
establish a record at trial separating filed but as yet unapproved
claims from unfiled (and therefore necessarily unapproved) claims. 59
Consequently, the full amount of the deduction for unapproved
claims was disallowed. 60

" See Jensen, supra note 7, at 920-21; cf. Crane, supra note 36, at 282-83.
55 The predictor will not concede, however, that he Was wrong on the merits.
See infra notes 77-83 and accompanyi~g text.
56
Justice Marshall wrote for a majority consisting also of Chief Justice Rehnquist ·and Justices Brennan, White, Powell, and Scalia. Justice O'Connor's dissent
was joined by Justices Biackmun and Stevens.
57
General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1736 (stating that "Genera} Dynamics was
... liable to pay for covered medical services only if properly documented claim
forms were filed") (emphasis in original). ·
58
Brief for United States .at 35, General Dynamics (No. 85-1385).
59· General Dynamics, 101 S. Ct. at 1737. The Court noted the general proposition that the taxpayer must show its entitlement to a deduction, citing Helvering
v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514 (1935). GD unquestionably had not provided the
·evidence that the Supreme Court said was needed to justify a deduction for filed
but as yet unapproved claims. Of course, GD was working under the understanding, supported by two lower court decisions, that the standards it had to meet
were different from those enunciated by the Supreme Court. In such a case, it
seems appropriate to remand the case to provide the taxpayer the chance to meet
the newly enunciated standards.
60
Five stages in the lifespan of employees' claims under an employer's selfinsurance program can be posited. First, for estimates associated with medical
services not yet performed and claims therefore not yet filed, GD took no deductions, consistent with the common understanding of the aU events test. Second,
with respect to services performed but claims not flied, GD had taken deductions-inappropriately, under the Supreme Court's decision. Third, for additions
to reserves associated with claims filed but not yet approved, the government had
argued that a deduction was not permissible, but GD apparently would have
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The Supreme Court's willingness to speculate was strikingly dif~
ferent in the two cases. In General Dynamics, the Court decided
that as a matter of law the fact of liability did not occur until the
filing of employees' claims, 61 and that failure to file was not an
"extremely remote and speculative possibility" of the sort considw
ered in Hughes Properties. 62 The Court made this determination
without the benefit of factual findings below. The Claims Court
had viewed GD's claims evaluation as "ministerial in nature,"
therefore not creating any contingency, 63 but it made no findings
with respect to the filing of claims. 64 Nevertheless, aided by the
government's briefs, the Supreme Court imagined its own contin~
gencies: 65
Some covered individuals, through oversight, procrastination, confusion over the coverage provided, or fear of
disclosure to the employer of the extent or nature of the
services received, might not file claims for reimbursement
to which they are plainly entitled. Such filing is not a
mere technicality. It is crucial to the establishment of
liability on the part of the taxpayer. 66

prevailed if it had proven the deductible amount attributable to such claims.
Fourth. for approved but unpaid claims, there was no dispute about deductibility,
see supra note 38, and, a fortiori, paid and previously undeducted claims, the
fifth category, were deductible.
61
General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1736 n.4. The filing was "a true condition
precedent to liability on the part of [GDJ." !d. at 1736 n.5.
62
!d. at 1736; United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 601-02
(1986).

6 CL Ct. at 254; 107 S. Ct. at 1736 n.4.
General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1736 n.4. GD conceded arguendo that a
"few employees" entitled to file claims did not do so, Brief for Respondents at
18, General Dynamics (No. 85-1385), but the record is silent, and the Claims
Court made no findings, on that issue. The record does indicate that employees
occasionally .filed claims later than required by the terms of the plans, and GD
technically had no obligation in such cases. Even substantially late claims (filed
two years or more after provision of services), however, were processed. Joint
Appendix at 131, General Dynamics (No. 85-1385) (testimony of J. David Loftus,
Aetna Life Insurance Co., one of the administrators of GD's plans).
6
' GD employed 56,000 people, see Stipulation of Facts, Joint Appendix at 25,
General Dynamics (No. 85-1385), and obviously some persons entitled to file
claims failed to do so. The Supreme Court dealt only with hypothetical contingencies, however. The Court's opinion does not depend on the existence of an
actual non-filer.
66 General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1736.
61

64
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Creating this list of imagined contingencies apparently involved
at least a modicum of critical evaluation by the Court because the
Court did not accept, or at least did not repeat, all of the reasons
suggested by the government that might lead to failure to file a ·
claim. For example, the government had speculated that "[s]ome
[employees} might regard the medical expenses that they had incurred as too insignificant to warrant the trouble of seeking reimbursement."67 Such a statementobviously reflects the youth, vigor,
and health of goven1ment attorneys. Many Justices have more experience with the high cost of medical care, however, and the Court
did not embrace this speculation.
But the Court's critical evaluation was limited. Inadvertence and
,neglect were unlikely, although not impossible, because hospitals
generally sent bills directly to GD. GD in turn "would inquire of
the employee if a claim form covering th.at hospitalization was ·not
turned in. " 68 Even bills sent directly to employees had a built-in
''tickler'' system because the providers of the medical services were
unlikely to let OD employees forget unpaid bills. Moreover, filing
a claims form was a simple task. 69 It should have been difficult,
but apparently it was not impossible, for even the most visionary
Justice to imagine an employee's failure to file a simple claims
form after being reminded to do so. 70
In contrast, the Hughes Properties Court had not engaged in
serious speculation about nonpayment by the casino, apart from
the "remote" possibilities of license surrender or voluntary bankruptcy. But why not? Suppose, for example, a progressive jackpot
winner walks away from his winnings. Bells ring, lights flash, and
casino employees (and Internal Revenue Service agents) descend
upon the winning machine, but the apparent winner does not claim

Brief for United _States at 35, General Dynamics (No. 85-1385).
Brief for Respondent at 18, General Dynamics (No. 85-1385); Joint Appendix
at 175, General Dynamics (No. 85-1385) (deposition testimony of C; Robert Schaal,
Prudential Insurance Co., one of GD's p!im administrators).
69
Joint Appendix at 174-75, General Dynamic~ .(No. 85-1385). The testimony
indicates that GD and its administrators . sought ·t'o make the filing process as
simple and convenient as possible for employees.
70 The Court's other suggestions are also questionable. For example, even assuming a willingness to forgo reimbursement, it is unlikely that an employee can
keep secret from an employer the "extent" of medical services if significant absence from work is involved.
61

68
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entitlement to the riches. Perhaps he wishes his identity not to be
disclosed to the government for other reasons. Or perhaps his spouse
thinks that, at the time he is anonymously playing the slot machines in Las Vegas, he is elsewhere; and several thousand dollars
in the family bank account (and on the family's tax bill71 ) would
be difficult to explain. Unlikely? Certainly. 72 Unimaginable? No. Is
the claim for payment that a winning jackpot player must make 73
therefore· a "mere technicality" as the reasoning of the General
Dynamics Court suggests? 74
If the order of the two cases had been reversed, and the Hughes
Properties litigants had been .faced with the language of the opinion
in General Dynamics, one would have expected an extensive argument about whether the claim for payment of the jackpot "is
crucial to the establishment of liability on the part of the taxpayer. " 75 Instead, the opinion in Hughes Properties is silent on the
potentially dispositive waiver issue. 76
Hughes Properties does not address the waiver issue for good
reason. In only a very limited sense does a casino not have a
This hypothetical assumes that the unwilling winner can avoid the tax liability
by refusing to accept the progressive jackpot. If the taxpayer is deemed to. have
received the prize under the doctrine of constructive receipt, and if the Internal
Revenue Service makes its presence .known, spouse evasion may be impossible.
72
As the dissenters in General Dynamics put it, the
speculative possibility [that an employee might not file a medical ex. penses ·claim) differs not at all from the speculation in Hughes Properties that a jackpot might never be paid by a casino .... The
beneficiary of a liability always has the option of waiving payment,
but a taxpayer is still unquestionably entitled to deduct the liability .
. 107 S. Ct. at 1739 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" Although casino procedure falls outside the author's expertise, it appears
from the record that a progressive jackpot winner must make a claim for payment
in order to receive the prize. See, e.g., Joint Appendix, United States v. Hughes
Properties, Inc., 476 U.S. 593 (1986) (No. 85-554) (affidavit of John H. Stratton,
member of Nevada Gaming Control Board) (describing procedures to be followed
upon complaint from casino customer that casino has wrongfully refused to pay
progressive jackpot). A nominal winner should therefore be able to waive his
winnings by making no claim.
74
See supra text accompanying note 66.
'' General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1736.
6
'
One reason for the difference in the two optmons is' that the government
presented the Supreme Court with more speculative contingencies in General Dynamics than it did in Hughes Properties. But that basis for distinction does not
carry one very far in understanding why. the Court was willing to evaluate suggested contingencies that were not based on factual findings of a trial court.
71
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liability to pay any prize until presentation of a valid claim. (This
is so even if the effect of a winner's failure to file a claim were
to discharge the casino's jackpot obligation fully with respect to
that machine. 77) For example, consider an accrual-basis corporate
taxpayer that contracts for cleaning services, the cost of which is
deductible to the corporation. The possibilities that the cleaning
company might not submit a bill or might not attempt collectionthe conceptual equivalents of an employee's failure to file a claim78
or a jackpot winner's failure to claim the jackpot-have never been
considered contingencies that would defeat deductibility. 79
It is the speculation in General Dynamics, not the silence of
Hughes Properties, that is noteworthy. General Dynamics represents
77
To be sure, one can construct a theoretical justification for treating the
potential waiver by a jackpot winner differently from the potential waiver of
medical reimbursement by a GD employee: the liability in Hughes Properties with
respect to a particular machine would not have disappeared altogether if one
winner had declined his prize. Under Nevada law the casino presumably would
have remained obligated to pay to the next willing winner a jackpot that included
the previously unclaimed amount. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
If the Court had distinguished the two cases on this basis, we could feel much
more comfortable about its ignoring the waiver-of-payment issue. See infra notes
78-79 and accompanying text.
The parties and the Court did not view the dispute in those terms, however.
The Service argued that the winning pull of the handle constituted the dispositive
event, without regard to· the possibility of waiver. Thus, the government emphasized when a claim could be made, not, as in General Dynamics, when it in fact
had been made. See Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 602 (Service argued "until
[a winning pull], there is no one who can make a claim for payment"). Although
the Court ultimately rejected the government's argument, it took the argument ·
seriously.
Moreover, the Court in Hughes Properties ignored the time. value of money on
the facts of the case. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. If one winner
had waived his prize, it would have taken an additional 4-l/2 months, on the
average, for another winner to come along, and it could have taken several years.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. Once the possible period of nonpayment lengthens-and it requires only a little imagination to extend the period
considerably-it becomes much more difficult to dismiss time value of money
concerns. See infra note 98.
78 In the General Dynamics situation, the medical facility also provided services.
That facility's possible failure to submit a bill also should not be treated as a
fatal contingency because it is as remote a possibility as can be imagined.
79
See Jensen, supra note 7, at 920-21; supra note 72; see also Crane, supra
note 36, at 282 ("The government offers no suggestion that there is anything
special· about the method of presentation and approval involved in this case that
would distinguish it from any other case in which services are rendered before a
formal biH is presented and approved for payment."}.
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a retreat from the principle that an obligation may exist although
there is a possibility that it will not be paid. 80 Tax advisors face
real difficulties in explaining to clients the factors, if any, that
justified different results in the two cases. As a practical matter,
given the Court's difficulties at reconciliation, perhaps neither case
has application beyond its narrow facts. 81
The problems of a taxpayer in the post-General Dynamics world
mirror the Supreme Court's own division: only five Justices were
part of the majority in both cases, an unusual breakdown on a
technical issue unlikely to evoke strong feelings. 82 Strikingly, the
authors of both the majority and dissenting opinions in Hughes
Properties (Justices Blackmun and Stevens, respectively) thought the
General Dynamics majority misapplied the principles set out only
eleven months before in Hughes Properties. 83

B. The Second Prong of the All Events Test: Was It Implicated
in General Dynamics?
The General Dynamics Court faced one insuperable problem in
denying GD a deduction in 1972, while fitting the analysis comfortably within the traditional cases governing the all events test.
The Court was presented with only the fact of liability issue. Be-

so See Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 607 (Stevens, J,, dissenting) (distinguishing between nonpayment of existing obligation and nonexistence of obligation).
81
. Because the analysis will change, and the role of the all events test will be
diminished, in "nonrecurring" cases governed by the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
see infra notes 102-60 and accompanying text, limiting Hughes Properties and
General Dynamics to their facts should cause no great harm. Of course, a narrow
reading makes the Court's bewildering grant of certiorari even more bewildering.
See Jensen, supra note 7, at 911-13.
82 The strongest feeling tax cases evoke among Supreme Court Justices is often
disdain. See supra note 8.
The five common members of the two majorities were Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist. See supra notes 47 & 56. Chief Justice Burger,
who dissented in Hughes Properties,. retired prior to consideration of General
Dynamics; new Justice Scalia joined the General Dynamics majority.
Bl Justice O'Connor, who had joined in the Hughes Properties majority, authored the General Dyl1llmics dissent, concluding that "[i]n my view, the circumstances of this case differ little from those in Hughes Properties." United States
v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732, 1738 (1987). Certainly the language
of an opinion provides little guidance to taxpayers if the author of that language
(in this case, Justice Blackmun) has problems with its application so soon after
promulgation.
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cause GD's claimed deduction greatly exceeded its ultimate reimbursement obligation, 84 however, the case is more easily seen as
involving the second prong of the test, the amount of the claimed
liability. 85
As of the end of taxable year 1972, a year in which medical
services had unquestionably been provided to GD employees, 86 all
events had occurred to fix the fact of some liability. GD did not
know the precise extent of the obligation at that time. Because not
all medical costs were eligible for reimbursement, some claims might
have been denied in whole or in part. Furthermore, the plan administrator might later have challenged the legitimacy of some
claimed expenses. But an obligation existed with respect to any
covered and uncontested claims. 87 What was uncertain was the

a• See supra note 45.
.
" Cf. Bradley & Winslow, supra note 4, at 229 (reasonable accuracy requirement provided Service best challenge. to deductibility of uncontested, undiscounted
future liabilities in worker's compensation cases). In several cases, the Ninth Circuit permitted employers a deduction for the undiscounted amount of future worker's compensation liabilities attributable to employee injuries occurring in the years
of. deduction. The court held that the fact of injury fixed the fact of liability in
each case, and the taxpayers successfully employed aggregate analyses (rather than
case-by-case inquiries) to demonstrate the amounts of the claimed lial;lilities. See,
e~g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1983): Crescent
Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r, 518 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1975). Some courts
disfavor aggregate .analysis to establish the fact of !lability, however. See, e.g.,.
Supermarkets Gen'l Corp. v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 759, 762 (D.N.J. 1982};
Bradley & Winslow, supra note 4, at 224-25; Jensen, supra note 3, at 461.
86
Medical services had "unquestionably" been provided, that is, if any sort of
reasonableness standard applies to the analysis of a corporate group that has
56,000 employees. See supra note 65. GD did not necessarily know which employees had received treatment, but the Court had concluded in Hughes Properties
that the identity of the beneficiary need not be known for a liability to be ftxed.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, at oral argument Justice
Scalia argued to GD counsel that "you do not know if any medical operation
has taken place .... You are guessing that the claims exist." Quoted in Uhlfelder, Supreme Court Considers Deductibility of Accrued, But Unpaid, Medical
Expenses, 34 TAX NoTES 200, 200 (1987). See also Supreme Court: Counsel Argue
Accrual of Payments Under Employee Medical Plans, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA)
G-7, G-10 (Jan. 14, 1987) (Chief Justice Rehnquist hypothetically questioned whether
travel expenses should be deductible "only knowing that somewhere in your vast
empire some people will travel without knowing if anyone in fact did travel").
87
See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304, 1306 n.3 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that injury established fact of liability with respect to uncontested
worker's compensation claims; not conclusive that employee might recover so
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amount of that obligation, and that question had been removed
from the Court's scrutiny. 88

quickly that he would not miss work); see also Wien Consol. Airlines, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 528 F.2d 735, 737 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that liability is fixed although
employee might not survive into subsequent taxable years). The plan administrator
might later have wrongfully denied a valid claim, but the company's obligation
still would have been fixed at the earlier time.
Th.e administrator was an agent of GD, and the administrator's denial of a
claim in the year medical services were performed should have been treated as a
contest of the claim by GD. Because a contest generally defeats the fact of a
liability, no deduction should have been permitted under these circumstances unless
and until GD also paid the disputed claim. See infra note 187.
If a contest occurred in a later taxable year, however, the liability remained
fixed as of the end of the year in which the services were performed (or, under
the Supreme Court analysis, the end of the year in which the claim was filed).
Assuming the taxpayer demonstrated the amount of liability with reasonable accuracy, proper tax accounting should have required a deduction in that year. If
payment had not yet been made in the year in which GD contested the previously
fixed liability, the tax benefit rule would have required an adjustment to GD's
self-correcting resente, effectively constituting an inclusion of the amount pniviously deducted. The contest would have been an event "fundamentally inconsistent
with the premise on which the deduction was initially based." See Hillsboro Nat'l
Bank v. Comm'r, · 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983) (inclusionary tax benefit rule).
GD did not reimburse all claims submitted by GD employees. See supra note
40. But that too should not have defeated the fact of a liability, and, by treating
filing as. the critical event, the Supreme Court implicitly' agreed. Before. an administrator's evaluation, it might have been impossible for a neutral observer to
determine exactly what portion, if any, of a particular claim .was entitled to
reimbursement. Nevertheless, all events had oc.curred to fix the fact of some
liability, evim though the extent of that obligation was then not precisely known.
See infra note 88.
•• United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926), the case that gave birth to
the all eventS test, supports this analysis. Anderson considered the timing of
deduction of a munitions tax that was imposed on 1916 profits but was actually
paid by the accrual-basis taxpayer in 1917. The taxpayer established accounting
reserves for reasonably expected expenses, including the munitions tax. Because
events occurring in 1916 fixed the munitions tax, the Supreme Court required the
tax to be deducted in that year. Of course, the taxpayer had not actually calculated the tax as of the last day of the year, and it may· have been impossible
practically (because of cost, among other things) to make such a theoretically
possible calculation.
Similarly, GD could in theory have accumulated all of the information and
made all of the calculations about its uncontested reimbursement obligations on
the last day of 1972. That it was a practical impossibility to do so should not
have been fatal. Cf. Uncasville Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 55 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir.
1932) (Hand, J.) {"All the facts upon which the calculation depended had been
fixed before the expiration of the year 1918 .... The computation was uncertain,
but its basis was unchangeable; it was unknown, not unknowable on December
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Indeed, the uncertainties about GD's reimbursement obligation
necessarily implicated both prongs of the all events test. During
oral argument in General Dynamics, several Justices suggested that
the fact and amount questions may not always be analytically separable. 89 That line of analysis, if pursued in the Court's opinion,
would have led to an interesting reconsideration of the all events
test. 90 Moreover, that analysis would have provided a reasoned basis
for distinguishing the results in Hughes Properties and General
Dynamics. 91
The Court did not take a new theoretical step, however. Because
of the regulatory language, the all events test has historically been
treated as having two distinct components92 even though they were
not always kept distinct. 93 Steadfast to that tradition, the opinion
in General Dynamics limits itself to the fact of liability issue, and
consequently the Court crammed its conclusion into an ill- fitting
conceptual box. The Court decided the case on a narrow ground,
but failed to advance our understanding of that ground.

C.

The All Events Test and Formalism

Both Hughes Properties and General Dynamics purported to consider only the fact of liability issue, and on that issue the juxta-'
position of the two cases is conceptually puzzling. Apparently a
court may formulate contingencies on its own that could cause an
employee to forgo reimbursement of medical claims, while a court

31, 1918. That is the test"); Crane, supra note. 36, at 283 ("omniscient presence"
could have precisely determined extent of GD's liability at end of 1972).
•• See Supreme Court: Counsel Argue Accrual of Payments Under Employee
Medical Plans, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) G-7, G-9 (Jan. 14, 1987).
90
If the Court fe!Luncomfortable taking a step arguably outside the boundaries
of the grant of certiorari, and it still wanted to decide the case, it could have
asked for further briefing and argument on this issue.
91
As the case was presented to the Claims Court, there was no question that,
if Hughes had a liability, the payoff indicators accurately measured it. See supra
text accompanying note 28.
92
~ee Buckeye Int'l, Inc. v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 376, 383 & n.8 (1984)
(descnbing analytical benefits of "[p]reserving the distinction between the two
requirements of the· all events test" set out in the Treasury regulations); Supermarkets Gen'l Corp. v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 759, 762 (D.N.J. 1982}
(rejecting use of aggregate analysis to prove the fact of a liability because "case
law does not support an integration of the two prongs of [the all events] test").
9' See Jensen, supra note 3, at 458 n.84.
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may not engage in similar speculation with respect to the winner
of a progressive jackpot. Perhaps there is a principle lurking behind
this distinction, or maybe it is an overstatement to refer to the
·
"principles" of the all events test..
Subsections I.B and I.C above criticized the two cases in light
of traditional all events test jurisprudence. A more fundamental
difficulty confronted the Supreme Court, however,· in its attempted
reconciliation of the cases. The all events test is at best tangentially
relevant to the time value of money, the reason for the controversies over the test's application. A rule of administrative convenience
that is intended to facilitate decision-making, 94 the all events test
as applied in these cases increases uncertainty and therefore hinders
tax planning.
The government's concern in disputes over the all events test is
that the taxpayer, if successful, secures deductions in amounts that
exceed the · true cost of the liabilities. For example, consider a
taxpayer that can demonstrate a fixed, definite liability to pay $100
in five years for an otherwise deductible expense. If the all events
test is met (that is, both the fact and the amount of the liability
are fixed), and if no other statutory barrier intervenes, 95 the tax- .
payer could deduct currently the entire $100 without any discounting to reflect the time value of money. Therefore, a liability with
a present 'value of less than $100 could generate a current deduction
equal to the full $1 00-a "premature accrual. " 96
A premature accrual arises when a deduction precedes payment
(or other satisfaction) of a liability and the deduction is not discounted to reflect that time interval. The all events test by its terms

94
Cf. Gunn, supra note 3 (when conflict exists between matching principle and
administratively manageable timing rules, courts have reasonably deferred to the
administrable rules).
·
9' See infra notes 102-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1984.
.. The present value of that future obligation, using a discount rate of 56Jo
compounded semiannually, is $78.12. That is, if the taxpayer invested $78.12 today
at a 5% after~tax rate of return, it would have the $100 in five years necessary
to satisfy the liability. Other authors have posited extreme cases that produce
"cost-free" liabilities, where the tax savings from the accelerated deduction equals
or exceeds the true cost of the liability. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3, at 266;
McGown, Structured Settlements: Deduct Now and Pay Later, 60 TAXEs 251, 25153 (1962).
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is not directed at this discrepancy. 97 Because the all events test was
the governing legal standard, the taxpayers and the government in
Hughes Properties and General Dynamics necessarily couched their
arguments in the language of the test. 98 Nevertheless, the fights
were about timing. 99 The government sought a rationale that would
delay satisfaction of the all events test as long as possible; the
taxpayers sought an interpretation of the all events test that would
accelerate the deductions as much as possible.
The deferral at issue provided a potentially substantial economic
benefit in each case. For example, in Hughes Properties, one of
the slot machines had not paid its progressive jackpot for several
years. 100 And, in General Dynamics, some of the claims for medical
services performed in 1972 were apparently not paid until 1974. 101

97
Historically the Internal Revenue Service usually took the position that a
liability could not be fixed under the all events test until activities were performed
that would satisfy the liability. That requirement is very much like the economic
performance standard added in the 1984 Act by a Congress newly enlightened
about the time value of money. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 477, 457-59; infra
notes 102-15 and accompanying text; see also supra note 48 and accompanying
text {Supreme Court rejected performance requirement in Hughes Properties). But
see infra note 133 (discussing Rev. Rul. 69-429, 1969-2 C.B. 108, which permitted
undiscounted deduction of worker's compensation liability without imposition of
performance requirement). The Service was sometimes successful with the argument, sometimes not. When the Service was unsuccessful, it had obviously failed
to 'convince the court that the language of the all events test mandated the performance requirement. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 467-68; Note, supra note 3,
at 201 ("The all events test is blind to the time value of money.").
98
The government probably should not have limited its attack on premature
accruals to the all events test. Particularly when the time between accrual and
payment was long-so that the tax benefit of a current deduction may even have
exceeded the cost of the liability-the Service should have been able to argue
successfully that the accounting method used did "not dearly reflect income."
The Code gives the Commissioner broad authority to require changes in accounting
methods. See I.R.C. § 446(b); see also Gunn, supra note 3, at 30-32 (government
should argue "that an immediate deduction for expenses paid in the future distorts
income"). The Service seldom made this argument, however. See id.; Jensen, supra
note 3, at 470-76; Bradley & Winslow, supra note 4, at 231. Mooney Aircraft v.
United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969), is a notable case in which the Service
successfully pressed a "clear reflection" argument to deny a current deduction for
a liability that might not have been satisfied for 30 years; the interval was "too
long." 420 F.2d at 409-10.
99
The government did argue time value considerations in Hughes Properties,
but the Supreme Court summarily rejected that argument. See supra note 50.
100
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
101
General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 250, 256 (1984). Some
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The resolution of these cases under the all events test required
discussion about the nature of events-provision of medical services
versus filing of claims versus approval of claims-but the discussion
lacked any connection to the fundamental timing issue. It was not
the nature of the events, but the time of the events in relation to
the payment satisfying the taxpayer's liability that was crucial to
the economic result in each of the two cases. The Court's fumbling
effort to define the last "event" fixing a liability was necessarily
formalistic with a test untouched by sophistication about the time ·
value of money. In the Tax Reform Act of 1984, the subject of
the next section of this article, Congress tried to provide a theoretical grounding for the all events test.
III.
A.

THE 1984 TAX

AcT AND PREMATURE AccRUALS

New Section 46J(h)

In the 1984 Tax Act, Congress significantly changed the rules
goyerning the timing of deductions by accrual-basis taxpayers. While .
elevating the all events test from the regulations to the Code, 102
new section 461(h) requires that a deduction generally be taken no
earlier than "economic performance" with respect to the Iiability. 103

of the lengthier delays may have been due to GD challenges to claims, and those
amounts should have been subject to the rules governing contested liabilities. See
supra note 87. But other delays had other causes, such as employees' failures to
file claims on a timely basis.
102 The new Code provision tracks the language of the regulations: "the all
events test is met with respect to any item if all events have occurred which
determine the fact of liability and the amount of such liability can be determined
with reasonable accuracy." I.R.C. § 46l(h)(4).
103 I.R.C. § 46l(h)(l). The Code subjects the economic performance requirement
to a potentially important exception for "certain recurring items." A liability will
be considered as incurred within a taxable year if four conditions are satisfied:
(1) the all events test, applied without an economic performance requirement, is satisfied;
(2) economic performance in fact occurs within a reasonable period
after the close of the taxable year (and no later than 8-1/2 months
after such close);
(3) the item is recurring and the taxpayer's treatment is consistent
from year to year; and
(4) either the item is not a material item or accrual in the taxable
year results in a "more proper" matching of expenses and income
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As a result, to be entitled to deduct a future obligation in the

current taxable year, a taxpayer must now 104 demonstrate not only
the fact and the amount of the liability, but also that economic
performance has occurred or is occurring.
The nature of the transaction determines the time when economic
performance is deemed to occur. For example, economic performance attributable to an obligation to provide or pay for property
or services occurs only upon provision of the property or services. 105
Economic performance with respect to a liability arising either under a worker's compensation statute or out of a tort occurs only
as payments are made to another person. 106 The Code authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury to provide exceptions to these rules 107
and to define economic performance for cases not specifically covered by the statute. 108
Section 461(h) generally operates to defer deductions beyond the
time that they .could have been taken under prior law . 109 Indeed,
than would accrual in a later year.
I.R.C. § 461(h)(3)(A). See also Jensen, supra note 3, at 480-81. Although the
addition of the economic performance requirement diminishes the importance of
the all events test, application of the test continues to be of controlling importance
in determining availability of the "recurring items" exception.
The "recurring items" exception contains many ambiguities, however, and, "in
many if not most of the cases, it. will be difficult to determine if the exception
is available.'' Bowers & Stone, Some Items Still Deductible Under All-Events Test
Despite New Economic Performance Rules, 64 J. TAX'N 354, 356 (1986). For
example, how should the second requirement, the 8-112 month test, be applied to
facts like those of Hughes Properties and General Dynamics? In those cases, the
liabilities were generally, but not always, satisfied within a short period after the
end of the year in which the taxpayers claimed deductions. Should compliance
with the test be measured on an aggregate basis or by use of a claim-by-claim
analysis? See Jensen, supra note 7, at 917-18 (discussing this issue) .
104
.
The changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 are generally effective
for deductions that under prior law would have been allowable after July 18,
1984 (the date of enactment of the 1984 Act). Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 9l(g){l),
98 Stat. 494, 608.
1
0' I.R.C. §§ 461(h)(2)(A), 46l(h)(2)(B).
106 LR.C. § 461(h)(2)(C).
101
I.R.C. § 461(h)(2) (introductory language states "[e]xcept as provided in
regulations prescribed by the Secretary").
we I.R.C. § 46l(h)(2)(D).
"'9 See Bowers & Stone, supra note 103, at 354. Because it adds a requirement
to the all events test, LR.C. § 461(h) cannot result in deductions earlier than
permitted under pre-1984 Act law. If the all events test and the economic performance requirement are satisfied simultaneously, the time of deduction is the
same whether pre-1984 Ad or post-1984 Act law governs.
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(:ongress added the section to the Code because it perceived· that
accrual-basis taxpayers had been generating deductions that exceeded the true cost of the corresponding liabilities. 110 Return to
the example of a taxpayer that has a present, fixed liability to pay
$100 in five years for an otherwise deductible expense.lll A current ·
deduction equals the cost of the liability only if the taxpayer is
limited to the present value of the future obligation, but uritil
recently neither the Code nor any judichil decision permitted a
discounted deduction in such circumstances.ll2 Under section 461(h),
if the future liability is associated with the provision of property
or services in year five, the $100 will not be deductible until that
tinie. In this example, the deduction and the true cost of the obligation will be perfectly meshed at ·the later date because,
''[e}cono1Uically, a present deduction of the present value [of a
future obligation] is equivalent to a future deduction of the future
value. "ll?
In their attacks on premature accruals, the changes made by the
1984 Act thu,s constitute a major improvement over pre-Act law.
In other cases, however, the meshing of deduction and cost may
not so closely approach perfection. Because the concern with pre-

11 9 See H.R. REP. No . .432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1254 (1984) [hereinafter 1984
House Report]; STAFF oF SENATE FINANCE CoMM, 98TH CoNG., 2D SEss., DEFICIT
REDUCTION TAX BILL OF 1984, EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE
CoMMITTEE ON MARcH 21, 1984, 271 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Senate
Report]; STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D
GENERAL.
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
1984, 260 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Blue Book].
" 1 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
itz See Burnham Corp. v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. no. 62 (May 11, 1988). Commentators have suggested the appropriateness of such discounting for accrual-basis
taxpayers. See, e.g., Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 3, at 811-23; Note, supra
note 3, at 202-08.
The Code now requires discounting of present deductions (rather than deferral
of undiscounted deductions) in certain specialized areas. For example, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 requires that the deduction available to non-life insurance
companies for "unpaid losses" be discounted to present value. See I.R.C. §
832(b)(5), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § l022(a),
100 Stat. 2085, 2397-99; I.R.C. § 846, as added by Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § l023(c), 100 Stat. 2085, 2399-404. See also infra notes
167-92 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 832(b)(5) (1982) as it applied
at time of General Dynamics).
113
Bradley & Winslow, supra note 4, at 233 (footnote omitted); see Ounn, supra
note 3, at 31 n.144.
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mature accruals is the time lag between deduction and payment (or
other satisfaction) of the liability, 114 the economic performance requirement corrects the disparity only to the extent that the time of
economic performance and payment coincide. A premature accrual,
although of reduced economic benefit, remains whenever further
· time elapses between economic performance and payment. If the
taxpayer receives services (and therefore economic performance oc~
curs) in year five bq.t pays the $100 for the services in year six,
the taxpayer will still receive the economic benefit of a deduction
that is one year premature under the new statute.H 5

B. The 1984 Tax Act, Progressive jackpots, and Medical SelfInsurance Plans: Judicial Misreading of Legislative History
The economic performance requirement did not apply in either
Hughes Properties or General Dynamics. 116 At the time the Court
considered Hughes Properties, the Justices may not have been aware
that the statutory changes could affect the analysis of later, similar
cases. 117 When section 461(h) does apply to such a gambling case,
this author has argued elsewhere that the section requires delaying
a deduction until the casino pays its prize, the position unsuccessfully advocated by the government in Hughes Properties. 118 Only
when the casino has paid-that is, has provided "property or serv·
ices'' to another person-is the economic performance test met. If
this interpretation is correct, and such a result is consistent with
what should have been the underlying theory of section 461(h), 119

114
See Gunn, supra note 3, at 35; Johnson, supra note 3, at 264-65.
"' Either the deduction is premature, or the amount of any deduction permitted
in year five should be limited to an appropriately determined present value of the
future obligation. But see supra note 112 and accompanying text. The present
value in year five of the. obligation to pay $100 in year six is $95.18, using a
discount rate of 50Jo compounded semiannually. Cj. supra note 96. However, if
LR.C. § 461(h) is applicable, and no other timing rule (such as LR.C. § 83(h)
or I.R.C. § 404(a)(5)) overrides the effect of that section, nothing would preclude
the taxpayer's taking a deduction for the full $100 in year five.
6
"
See supra note 104 (effective date of changes made by 1984 Act); see also
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732, 1735-36 n.3 (1987).
m See Jensen, supra note 7, at 911-12.
"" Id. at 917.
ll• See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. In private correspondence
and discussion, several readers have questioned the conclusion that economic performance occurs only when the prize is won. The critics correctly note that the
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the government's position in Hughes Properties is the statutorily
required result in post-1984 Act casino cases.
By the time of its decision in General Dynamics, the Court had
become aware that the statute had been modified and that future
cases will not be analyzed under the principles of General Dynamics
alone. Indeed,, in a footnote the Court not only acknowledged the
recent legislative developments, it also hinted at the effect of those
changes:
We do not address how this case would be decided under
§ 461(h), but note that the legislative history of the Act
indicates that, "[i]n the case of . . . employee benefit
liabilities, which require a payment by the taxpayer to
another person, economic performance occurs as the pay. ments to such person are made.'' 120

definitions of economic performance are generally not tied to the time of payment.
See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Joint Committee
Explanation of the Act provides that, for purposes of the rules governing provision
of property or services, the term "property" "does not include money." 1984
Blue Book, supra note 110, at 262; cf. Treas, Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (money is not
"property" for purposes of LR.C. § 83). But see infra note 132 (reduced significance to be given to Blue Book positions that are unsupported by other authority). The critics have suggested accordingly that the casino may be treated as
providing "services" each time a player pulls a slot machine handle, increasing
the progressive jackpot. The player receives "services," therefore, merely by playing the game. Under this analysis, with economic performance occurring as the
machines are played, I.R.C. § 461(h) would not change the result in a case like
Hughes Properties; the all events test and the economic performance requirement
would be satisfied· simultaneously.
This is a more than plausible argument. If the progressive jackpot cases must
be analyzed under I.R.C. § 46l(h), it is difficult to fit their peculiarities defini~
tively within the analytic boundaries of the statute; Congress did not legislate with
casino operations in mind. However-, the critics' suggested result would be inconsistent with the new section's goal of lessening premature accruals. See W. KLElN,
B. BITTKER, & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 437 (7th ed. 1987). Reading
the statute in light of its purposes favors the result suggested in the prior article.
When significant doubt about the time of economic performance remains under
the statutory language, a deduction should be deferred until the time of payment
(or other satisfaction of the liability) by the taxpayer.
''"' United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 n.3 (1987)
(quoting 1984 House Report, supra note 110, at 1255, and citing H.R. REP. No.
861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 872 (1984) (conference committee explanation of House
bill) [hereinafter 1984 Conference Report}).
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sentence, the Court did precisely what it purported
suggested the resolution of a similar case under the
statute.
How well does the Court's gratuitous suggestion stand up to
,....,.,.t,.-."·' Consider two economically similar cases. If Able performs
services for Baker, economic performance is deemed to occur with
the performance of the services. Thus, if the all events test is
met by that time, the statute then entitles Baker to a
If, however, Able performs services for an employee of
for which Baker is obligated to pay, the Court suggests that
economic performance occurs only upon payment. Is there any
principle that, from the standpoint of Baker, the party for whom
:~services are being performed directly or indirectly, 121 justifies a dif·
~ferent result in the timing of deductions?
"' Delay of the deduction until payment is consistent with the the·
that should have governed section 46l(h); such a rule would
eliminate premature accruals. 122 That theory, however, is not con·
reflected in the definitions of economic performance. The
by its terms permits the deduction of many liabilities before
payment occurs, 123 and there is nothing peculiar about services pro·
in connection with "employee benefit liabilities" that necesjustifie~ treatment different from the provision of services

121
Both Baker's employee and the provider of medical services provide services
to Baker. See infra note 124; note 132 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
123
See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. The statute defines economic
performance as occurring on payment only with respect to worker's compensation
and tort liabilities. I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(C).
124
At least there is nothing obviously peculiar about such liabilities, and the
Court did not enlighten us about any hidden peculiarities that should have coneffect. Two possibilities come to mind, but neither persuasively requires
reading a payment requirement into the statute.
· ~~ First, in the employee reimbursement situation, it is unclear from the statutory
;~anguage whose services are relevant-that is, whether the analytical focus should
be on the medical services or on the employee's services to the employer. See W.
KLEIN, B. BITTKER & L. STONE, supra note 119, at 437 (assuming performance
of medical services was controlling). But see infra note 135 and accompanying
text (conference committee report suggesting economic performance occurs as· emperforms services). Whatever uncertainity may exist on this point, however,
provides no reason to delay the deduction until a still later time, the time of
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Moreover, the language of section 46l(h) does not suggest that
medical self-insurance plans should be governed by any principle
other than that applicable to Hservices , . , provided to the taxpayer"; that is, economic performance occurs with the performance
of services. 125. The government could argue that the medical services
(assuming those are the critical services for analytical purposes 126)
are npt being provided to the ''taxpayer," a self-insured employer
like GO, but to the employee. Such an argument is formalistic at
best. If the services. are provided at a taxpayer's expense pursuant
to a contract between the taxpayer and its employees, they are
being provided for the indirect benefit of the taxpayer-employer.
This leaves no basis for distinguishing the two hypothetical cases
involving services, and the Court's suggestion about the effect of
section 461(h) is therefore suspect. Although it is perhaps unfair
to chastise the Court for not providing a justification grounded in
theory on an issue that the Court purported not to have addressed,
the failure on this point goes beyond lack of theoretical sophisti-

payment for the medical services. Moreover, the uncertainity will, in nearly all
cases, have no practical effect because the two types of services are provided
simultaneously. The medical services will be provided to an employee (or family
member of an employee) during that person's employment.
Second, in some employer-employee cases, concern may arise over the employer's deduction preeeding the inclusion of income by the employee. Some Code
provisions seek to ensure ''inter-taxpayer matching," deferring a deduction u~til
a corresponding inclusion occurs. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 83(h) (deferring deduction
attributable to compensation-related transfer of property until amount is included
in gross income of services-provider). With a plan like that in General Dynamics,
inter-taxpayer matching is not fully implicated, however, because the reimbursement of the medical expenses would generally be excludable from the gross income
of the employees. See I.R.C. § 105(b); see also Crane, supra note 36, at 282
(''The ultimate recipients of the amounts to be paid by [GD] can be identified,
and, if they were all accrual basis taxpayers, they could all be charged with income
as a result of the performance of services.").
t;;s I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(A) provides:
If the liability of the taxpayer arises out of(i) the providing of services to the taxpayer by another person,
economic performance occurs as such person provides such services,
(ii) the providing of property to the taxpayer by another person,
economic performance occurs as the person provides such property,
or
(iii) the use of the property by the taxpayer, economic performance
occurs as the taxpayer uses such property.
,,. See supra note 124; infra note 132 and accompanying text.
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cation. The language that the Court quoted from the legislative history applied to a version of the 1984 legislation that was not
enacted. Presumably badly advised by its derks, the Court violated
a basic tenet of statutory interpretation: interpretive passages in a
congressional committee report should be .examined in ·light of the
language that the report is interpreting.
The full language of the committee report, without the CourCs
artful ellipsis, provides that, ''[i]n the case of workees compensa~
tion; tort, and employee benefit liabilities, which require a payment
by the taxpayer ·to another person, economic performance occurs
a.S the payments to such person are made." 127 That passage interprets language in the House bill that said precisely the same thing,·
language that applied to the three named categories of liabillties. 128
But that language did not survive the legislative process intact.
During its deliberations, the conference committee deleted the bill's
reference to "employee benefit liabilities. n 129 The statutory section
as enacted treats "payment" as the event constituting economic
performance only for worker~s compensation and tort liabilities.. 130
The conference committee report does not explain the deletion
of the reference to "employee benefit liabilitiesY Perhaps the Supreme Court was correct .in implying ··that economic performance
and hence deduction of such liabilities should await payment. m
1984 House Report, supra note UO, at 1255.
H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9l(a) (1984), reprinted in 1984 House
Report, supra note 110. In the bill, employee benefits subject to the rules of
I.R.C. § 404 (dealing with certain deferred compensation plans), I.R.C. § 404A
(dealing with foreign deferred compensation plans), and LR.C. § 419 (dealing with
127

lla

defined welfare benefit funds) were excepted from the economic performance rules
of proposed l.R.C. § 46l(h).
129 Similar to the House version, the Senate bill defined economic performance
as payment to another person for the same three named categories of liabilities.
The biiUncluded the same exceptions, see supra note 128, and added another: if
payments were made within 2-112 months after the close of the taxable year, the
special rule for "employee benefit liabilities" was not to apply. Thus, in such a
. case, economic performanc~ would be defined as the time of services, not the
time of payment. S. 2062, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1,l(a) (1984), reprinted in 1984
Senate Report, supra note .110.
1'o I.R.C. § 46l(h)(2)(C).
Ill But see infra notes 136-60 and accompanying text (suggesting proper post·
1984 Act analysis). It is true that deferraL of a deduction until payment would
eliminate the premature accrual effect, and, when there is substantial doubt about
the time of economic performance, the legislative language should be interpreted
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That is a peculiar inference to draw, however, from Congress'
deletion of a phrase that would have unequivocally secured that
result. Moreover, the conference committee suggested that economic
performance may occur even prior to the provision of medical
services, at the time the employee provides services to the employer.132

in a way that reduces premature accruals. See supra note 119. But the Court was
not ·making an argument about uncertainty on this issue; it merely quoted language
from a questionably relevant committee report as if that language removed any
doubt.
132
The conference report stated that "economic performance with respect to a
liability to an employee generally occurs as the employee renders his or her services." 1984 Conference Report, supra note 120, at 877 (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court had cited to the conference report, see supra note 120, as if that
report supported its suggestive nonsuggestion about "employee benefit liabilities."
However, the page citation is to the conference committee's description of the
House bill, not to a discussion of the committee's own product. See 1984 Conference Report, supra note 120, at 872.
The Joint Committee on Taxation's General Explanation of the Act (the "Blue
Book") lends support to the Supreme Court's implication: "Economic performance with respect to employee benefits (other than compensation) occurs generally
when the employer makes a payment under the benefit plan (rather than when
the services are rendered)." 1984 Blue Book, supra note 110, at 267. If the Joint
Committee's language purports to explain LR.C. § 461(h), however, its statutory
·
origin is obscure.
Perhaps· the Blue Book language merely means that other statutory sections,
such as I.R.C. § 404, see infra notes 136-60 and accompanying text, may often
defer deductions until payment and thus may have the effect of preempting LR.C.
§ 46l(h). So interpreted, the language would be less objectionable. An example
provided in the Blue Book, however, suggests that the .Joint Comniittee staff
intended the language to mean precisely what it says about the time of economic
performance .. See 1984 Blue Book, supra note llO, .at 267 (contribution to trust
under funded welfare benefit plan that, because of effective date of LR.C. § 419,
was not governed by that section, said to be deductible only at time of payment
under LR.C. § 46l(h)); infra note 138 (describing effect of LR.C. § 419).
Even if the Joint Committee staff intended the Blue Book language to explain
l.R.C. § 46i, the language should be given relatively little interpretive weight
because it is arguably contrary to the conference committee report. Cf. Bank of
Clearwater v. United States, 7 CL Ct. 289, 294 (1985):
It is this court's view that, although said Joint Committee Explanation
prepared by the staff does not rise to the level of authority given to
legislative history, we do not perceive it as totally worthless or unenlightening. It is common knowledge that the congressional staff of the
Joint Committee works very closely with the members of Congress in
drafting legislation and undoubtedly has "eyeball knowledge" of the
fundamental legislative purpose of a given piece of legislation. Absent
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We can only speculate about the reason for the deletion. Perhaps
the conference committee determined such a liability is likely to
have a sufficiently short "tail" -the time between accrual and payment-:-and that consequently the economic benefit from an accelerated deduction falls within acceptable limits. In contrast, because
worker's compensation and tort liabilities may be discharged in
installments over extended periods of time, those liabilities are precisely the kind of potentially abusive liabilities that most concerned
commentators. 133
Another possible explanation, supported by a great deal of circumstantial evidence, is that the conference committee concluded
no special reference to "employee benefit liabilities" was necessary
in section 461(h) because other statutory provisions generally determine the timing effect of such liabilities. 134 Indeed, the committee
noted that "an employer's deduction for compensation or other
benefits paid to an employee in a year subsequent to economic
performance is subject to the rules in the Code . . . governing

any definitive legislative history that is more revealing, the court believes it is proper nonetheless, in the absence of any comparable contrary assertions, to give substantial weight to this Explanation. At the
very least; it should receive no less recognition than a thesis of a text
writer on a given point.
The Blue Book is a staff-prepared report that neither congressional tax committee
reviews; it merely reflects the staff's understanding of congressional intent. See
STAFF OF .JT, CoMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM

1976 III (Comm. Print 1976).
See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 4, at 232. In Rev. Rul. 69-429, 1969-2
C.B. 108, the Service had surprisingly ruled that, in the case of a worker's
compensation settlement award to be paid in installments over several years, a
self-insured employer could deduct the total undiscounted amount of the future
awards in the year of settlement. (For example, if the obligation were to pay
$1,000 per year for 10 years, the employer could currently deduct the full $10,000,
rather than the present value of the future stream of payments.) Imaginative
planners urged the use of this principle in structuring tort settlements as well. See
McGown, supra note 96, at 252-53. In certain extreme cases, it was possible to
structure a settlement that, because of the value of the current, undiscounted tax
deduction, provided an overall economic benefit to the payor. In response to one
such example, Professor Gunn remarked, "If this is the law [prior to the 1984
Act], "well-advised accrual-method businesses should cancel their liability insurance
and run down pedestrians at the rate of at least one a year." Gunn, supra note
3, at 26.
134
The Supreme Court, in quoting from the House Report, assumed that I.R.C.
§ 461(h} would control. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
AcT
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deferred compensa:tion 1 deferred benefits, and fW!J;ded welfare benefit plans.' ms TliliUS 1 the committee S:t.llggested that even though economic performance is deemed to occur as the emplo;yee performs:
his S:el'V:i.ces (subj:ectt of course, to the Treasury's po,wer to change
the rules)~ other sections may require deferral of the employer's.
deducti.on beyond the: time of economic perfo.rmance. Suhse.ction
UJ.C bdo;w attempts to locate the· analysis of empl0cyee benefit
Habllities within the new s.tatuto.ey scheme.
C. Timlng €t/ Deducti'Qns, Jar Employ~ Benefit
ful!l!ded Med/ical' ReiRJJburrsem:eul Pf(l!lflS

Liabilities~~

Un . .

The analysis Qf employee benef'lt. liabilities is: enormous.}y complex, Ult Merely locating the p.ruper analytiieal · starting point in the
Cooe for a particular liability can confus.e the very best. lawyers. rJm
This. article cannot pro;vide the definitive tteatise on the deductb.
b111ty of amo.unts; related: to Wllfunded medical reimb,u11semen:t plans;
it. is: enough for present purpo.s:es to demonmate the misleading
natme of the Su}J)reme Court''s; sugg,estiQ;n ab~t post~t984 Act law.
Fur th()se lawye:trs ed:Wlcated abourt emplo;yee benefits~. the· Co.urt has
added eonfusiion to an ah'eady c.onfUs:ed aa'ea. For inexperienced
lawyers, the Court applied a vetieer ();ff simplicity to an area that
i:s decidedly n'O:t. simple.
' If a. medical reimb-urs:eme:nt pl:S~n is; umrt'oodedt;;s and it proiV'iides

1 ~5 1984 CQDference Repo.rt:, supra note 120, at 877. Accordingly, be.c.anse the
ml:e defining economic perfo.11mance as payment does no:t include emplo~ee: fuenefit
1iabilities, ~he H!!!us.e and Senate biHs' 11eferences tQ LR.C. §§ 404, 404A,. aad 41!9

to that rule were l1!1necessary·. See, supra. notes 128-29.
Subsection m.c of this article can only suggest the nec.essa:ry oomplexity."
The analysis of medical reimll>ursement plans provided here assumes th~ imapplicabiii:ty of L.R.C.. § 83,h) and Treas. Reg. § 1.83:...3(e}, which app1'y to' cnmpensation~related. transfers of "property,."' not including money; and LR..C. §. 404A,
dealing. with certaia foreiga deferred compensation plans.
1~ 7• The: author has read memoranda of maJor law firms that igno.ue tlhe effeets:
<0& SJill\lle of the p!(}tentiaUy crucial Code sections. See also W .. Kul~N:. B. BlTTKER
&; t .. STONE, supra: note 119, at 4137 ~aJso, ignoring LR.C .. § 404),
1 ~ 8 • ... UnfitrndeA'' means, for this: pmpo~. that the Feimbmtsement ol!>.ligatiott wiJYi
0e ~hat:~ed tbtlol!l'gn use of the· employer's general f~mds and th.e emplQ¥er hal;;
not takelll sfi~s to' segregate assets. (throu:gh separate trusts. bank acool:lSts,, and
SJ1>1 oa:) to meet the obligatiQl!l:. Moreove£> the analysis; in the; te.x.t II:SSlilmes. t:hat,
what~e11 tl.he nome!iU:lat.w;e used' hy the em:p!:oyer,. the tax effectiS; 4lf a reimb.wJse.
ment. pl~ wHir not 0.e, gQNerned by r.R..C... § 411~, re1atin~ to: avrangelil!tems tlil:at
a:S.,

e~ceptiol'l.IS

l:l!l
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"deferred benefits/' then under section 4{)4>39 the' employer may
deduct otherwise deducdble 140 amounts only as they are includable

constitute «funded welfare benefit plans." LR.C. § 419 and its companion provision, I.R.C. § 4t9A (dealing with qualified asset accounts), were added to the
Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 5Il(a), 98 Stat.
494, 854-61. and were amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99~514, § 1851, 100 Stat. 208~. 285S:-6J. If § 419 did apply, the employer would
effectively be put on a cash basi&, with contribution~ deductible (subject to' some
limitations) only as pafd to a ''welfare benefit fund."
A "welfare benefit fund'' is a ••fund which •.• is part of a plan of an
employer, ami . . . through which the employer provides welfare benefits to employees or their beneficiaries." LR.C. § 419(e)(l}... Welfare benefits/' in g.eneral,
are aU benefits other than those governed by LR.C. § 8J(h), I.R.C. § 404, or
LR.C. § 404A. t.R.C. § 419(e)(2);' see supra note 12:8 (describing oth~ cited Code .
sections).
Without a segregated account or fund created specifically to cover the pfan'sc
obligations, a reimbursement plan should avoid the application of LR.C. § 419.
Generallyr a «fund~' is defined as one of several enumerated tax-exempt organizati€Jns; a trust, corporation,. or other taxable entity; and, "to the extent provided
in regulations, any account held for an employer by any person." LR.C. § 419(e)(3),
The legislative history provides some guidance on what constitutes a ''fund":
In prescribing regulations relating to the definition of the term "fund/'
the conferees wish to emphasize that the principal purpose of this
provision . . . is to prevent employers from taking premature deduc·
tions", for expenses which have not yet been incurred, by interposing
an intermediary organization which holds assets which are used to
provide benefits to the employees of the employer.
1984 Conference Report, supra note 120, at 1155. The House Report indicated in
a footnote, however, that "employer contributions to a separate bank account of
the employer or to a subsidiary or other related party would not be considered
contributions te a fund!' 1984 House Report, supra note 110, at 1280 n.18.
Thoe analysis can be particularly confusing, and the possibility of application of
I.R.C. § 419 therefore correspondingly greater, if the employer interposes a third
party administrator, such as an insurance company, for the plan. Temporary
regulations have provided that "if art employer makes a payment to an insurance
company under an 'administrative services only' arrangement with respect to which
the life insurance Gompany maintains a separate account to provide benefits, then
the arrangement would be considered to be a 'fund.'" Temp. Treas. Reg. §
1.419-lT, A~3(c). But see Announcement 8'6-45,. 1986·15 I.R.B. 52 (darifyin:g ar~
rangements with insurance companies that will be classified as ''funds").
139 I.R.C. § 404 was modified irt both 1984 and 1986. The most noteworthy
modification for present purposes was the addition of I.R.C. § 404(b)(2). Tax
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No, 98-369, § 512(a), 98 Stat. 494, 862-63. SeF
infra note 141.
140 LR.C. § 404(a) provides, in relevant part, that
if compensation is paid or acerued on acwunt of any employee under
a plan deferring the receipt of sudr compern>ation, such ... compensation shaH not be ·deducti:bte under this chapter; but, if they tsicf
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in the gross income of employees (or as they would be includable
were it not for a statutory exclusion). 141 The requirement that the
amount "otherwise be deductible" means not only that the expense
must be an ordinary and necessary business expense (or have another statutory basis for deduction), but also that the statutory
timing requirements must be met. By its terms, section 404 acts
. only as a deferral provision: when the threshold all events test, as
modified by the economic performance requirement, has been satisfied, the employer must consider whether that section requires
still further deferral. 142
Integrating these statutory pieces-the all events test, the economic performance requirement, and section 404-in a simple example may be helpfuL Assume that an employee performed services

would otherwise be deductible, they [sic] shall be deductible under this
section, subject, however, to the following limitations· as to the amounts
deductible in any year.
Among the specified limitations is that of LR.C. § 404(a)(5). See infra note 141.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, I.R.C. § 404(a) required that the deductions be otherwise available under either I.R.C. § 162 or § 212. The 1986 Act
substituted the less restrictive "otherwise be deductible" language. Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 185l(b)(2)(C)(i), 100 Stat. 2085, 2863.
141
I.R.C. § 404(b)(2), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, § 512(a), 98 Stat. 494, 862-63, requires treating "any plan providing for
deferred benefits (other than compensation) for employees ... as a plan deferring
the receipt of compensation," and thus subject to the timing rules of LR.C. §
404(a). LR.C. § 404(b)(l) includes in the category of "plan" for this purpose any
method or arrangement having the effect of a plan. Section 404(a)(5) in general
requires deferring the deduction for an unfunded plan until "the taxable year in
which an amount attributable to the contribution is includible in the gross income
of employees participating in the plan.". In determining timing, it is irrelevant
that medical reimbursement would generally be excludable from the gross income
of employees. I.R.C. § 404(b)(2)(A); see supra note 124.
Like the economic performance rules, l.R.C. § 404(b)(2), as amended, is generally effective after July 18, 1984, the date of enactment of the 1984 Act. Tax
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 512(c), 98 Stat. 494, 863; Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.404(b)-1T, A-3.
Although the analysis herein involves reimbursement plans for employees, LR.C.
§ 404(d) in general applies the same timing rules to deferred compensation and
deferred benefits provided to independent contractors.
142 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.46l(h)-4T provides that, "[i]n the case of an accrual
method taxpayer, a contribution or compensation satisfies the requirements of
section 162 or 212 [i.e., is deemed to "otherwise be deductible," see supra note
· 140] only to the extent that the all events test ... and the economic performance
requirement . . . are satisfied."
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for an accrual-basis employer in 1986, received medical services and
filed a claim for reimbursement in 1986, and is reimbursed for the
medical costs under the employer's unfunded plan in 1987. Assume
also that both the employer and employee have a calendar-year
taxable year. The General Dynamics Court said the all events test
is satisfied upon filing a claim for reimbursement-1986 in this
example (if the reasonable accuracy requirement is met at that
time). 143 Under section 461(h), prior to any regulatory modification,
economic performance is apparently deemed to have .occurred as
the employee performed his services, also in 1986. 144 But absent a
statutory exclusion rule, the employee, as a cash-basis taxpayer,
would have to include the reimbursed amounts in income as received, in 1987. If this plan is a deferred benefits plan, 145 section
404 requires deferring the employer's deduction until 1987, the year
of payment, despite apparent compliance with section 461(h) in
1986.
Another consideration reinforces the conclusion that 1987 is the
appropriate year of deduction. Notwithstanding the suggestion in
the legislative history,146 the economic performance requirement will
not have been met in 1986. Under its statutory authority to modify
section 461(h)'s definitions, 147 the Treasury issued temporary regulations defining economic performance, in the case of a deferred
benefit that is governed by section 404 and that is received by a
cash-basis taxpayer, as the time of payment. 148
The analysis has come full circle. Economic performance, according to the temporary regulations, occurs upon payment. The

4
' '

144

See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.

145
Certainly the plan is a deferred benefits plan from a common sense perspective because it provides a deferred benefit to the employee who performed
the services in 1986 but receives the benefit-the reimbursement-in 1987.
146
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
,., See supra note 107 .and accompanying text.

148

In the case of a contribution or compensation subject to section 404
... , pursuant to the authority under section 46l(h)(2), economic performance occurs ... in the case of a plan subject to section 404,
either as the contribution is made under the plan or, if section 404(a)(5)
is applicable, as an amount attributable to such contribution is includible in the gross income of an employee ....
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.461(h)-4T, A-1.
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Supreme Court's suggestion in General Dynamics that the employer's deduction must await the year of payment therefore appears
to be correct, although by accident. 149 So interpreted, the economic
performance requirement merely leads to a result that section 404
would have provided anyway.150 Why should we care that the Supreme Court cited an irrelevant piece of legislative history if the
citation points us in the right direction? If an unfunded medical
reimbursement plan provides deferred benefits to cash-basis employees, a tax planner seems to have no leeway to achieve any
acceleration of deductions.
But it is not so simple. We should care about the Court's sloppiness. because the Court may wen have pointed us in the wrong
direction after alL A more detailed statutory map is necessary, and
some of the terrain is: not yet c:harted. The above analysis rested
on the assumption that a medical reimbursement plan necessarily
constitmes a deferred benefits, plan. 151 Under the temporary regulations, however, and with support in the legislative history, 152 benefits are treated as deferred only if the employee receives the benefits
more than a ''brief period of time'' after the end of the employer's
taxable year. 153 A plan is presumed to defer benefits for more than
a brief period only if the employee receives the benefits more. than
2-1/2. months after the dose of that year .1 54

14
g. 'l"he temporary regutations were promulgated on January 29, 1986, in T.D.
8073, 1986-1 C.B .. 65, and thu1> were available long before the Supreme Court's
dedsion in General Dynamics. A citati:on by the Court to the regulations would
have been more helpful than the citation to the House Report.
''" Even if the ''recurring· items'' exception operates in some cases to treat the
all ev;ents test as met in the year of filing, without satisfaction of the economic
performance requirement, see supra note 103, I.R.C. § 404 should defer the
deditrction untiJ the time of payment for any deferred benefit.
1'' 1 See Accounting Periods and Methods 203.031, at 370 (CCH Tax Transactions
Ubrary), (T.J. Purcell ed. 1987) (apparently assuming that medical reimbursement
plans are governed by deferred benefits rules).
152 "fl:']he conferees intend that payment of bonuses or other amounts within
2:- t/2 months after the· close of the taxable year in which significant services
required for payment have been performed is not to be considered a deferred
compensation or deferred benefit plan.,., 1984 Conference Report, supra note 120,
at H6fl See a.fso 1984 House Report,. supra note 110, at 1284 ("brief period"
rule); 1984 Blue Book,. supra note 1:10, at 805 (to same effect). The Senate version
of the bilf woufd have codified the 2~ 1/2 munth standard. See supra note 127.
153 Temp. Treas_ Reg. § 1.404{o}·lT, A-2(a}.
1"
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.40'4(b)-lT, A-Z(b)(l}. The regulatory 2-I/2. month rule
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The hypothetical medical :reimbursement plan therefore is not
cessarily a deferred b'enefits: plan. Suppose the plan required that
claims for medical services received in 1986 be filed in time to
,ow the claims to be paid by March 15 of the following year. In
ch a case,. no b~nefits: were d.eferred more than a brief period
yond the end of 1980,, and sec.ti'On 40'4 therefore does not apply.
le aU events test (as modified by the economic performance relirement} alone governs the timing of the employer's deduction.
tr those claims med in 19•86~ the fact o.f liability was then fixed.
s.ection 404 does not apply to me unfunded plan, the temporary
~ulations: do not specify that economic performance occurs with
;yment, t 55 and the statutory definitions of economic performance
ould cont1rol~ E.conomic pcrformance thuefore also occurred iin
8:6 with the· performance of services .. Accordingly,, the employer
owd have been entitled to· a deduction iin that year, even. if
yment did not occur nntH I987.m;.
~rtunr~

the prior positioo of the Internal Revenue Service that· treated a; plan
a deferred compensatioo or deferred benefits, plan 0nly if it deferred a payment
more t.~mn. 12. mon:ths after the cl:ose ofthe taxable year in which the emphnyer
:ru:~ a 11albi:lity tnad.er the pl!an. See, e ..g.,. Priv·. Ltr. Rul. 82-06-169 (Nov .. 17,
~1); Plri.v. Ltlr. Rut. 80:-06·06rf (Nov. 19, 1979} (citing New York. Seven:-Up:
ttling co.. v. COmm'r, 5~ T.C~ 391 (1968) (severance pay plan held to lire
'enre.d c0:mpen:sation plan where it provided employees terminating after more:
m five: years" continuous senice with one: week's pay for each year of service};
!li LUJD:dy Packing Co. v. United States, 302 F .. Supp. 182 (C •.D ..N.C. 1969.],,
"'d per curiam, 421 F.2d. SSO' (4th Cir. 1970) (sick pay plan held tO' b.e deferred
npensatio:t!l pmn where. it entitled employee to one week's. pay per year when
<~<b!e to wo,rlt or upoN termination of employmen•m; see alsv Letter from Calm
Johnson to David Brockway (July 2,. 1985), lteprinted in 28 TAx NoTE& 920
1'85) (cri1lici.zing vagueness of definition of "deferred" (prcier til> issoonce 0cf
:tp:orary replations) and resultant p.Qssibility of planning se:11ereiy premature

:ruafs).

ffue temp0.rary ue.gm.I~ti0ns m€Fecy create a. pres:unrpti.on. If the empl~er pr0¥ides
1efit:s outside the 2-U2 month perioo,. the employer may s.eek to demo:nstrate
tt the benefits. were nonethel:e~ provided within a "brief period of time~" To
lttt the preslll.mpti:on, the emp:l~en must sho:w that it was impracticable, either
:ninistrati:vel)' or econ0micaJ!l;y', to avoid the rnrther deferral: a~nd that, as of tl:!e

:Jl of the taxabl~ year, tfie: impractkabi:lity was unforeseeable. Temp:. Treas.. Reg.
~.4@:4i(hr).-1T~ A-2~b:){2).

" S.ee supra note. 148 a1ll:d: a~>:.companyi1ll:g text.
lit may, seem perverse that this analysis. reslill:ts hr

all0w~ng an employer aflr
ifl' some circumstances, tor an un•fun~d plan than• it would be
;itied to· for a eontribntion to a '~funded welifare be:aefit plan." see supra. note
~ (LR.C §: 419 defers. s.uclil a dedncti.om U:Rti:t year; 0::f payment te, flil!nd). None"
'less, perversity and the Code Me not mntm.any exclusive~
56

~lier d~t:l:.ctiOB+
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Consider another real world assumption. Suppose the plan did
not require that all reimbursements attributable to 1986 medical
services be made by March 15, 1987. Perhaps, in the interest of
labor harmony, the employer wished to honor· late claims. 157 The
plan thus provided deferred benefits, but not all of the benefits
were deferred. Many claims were in fact paid by the end of the
2-1/2 month period, but others were not. 158 Is the overall medical
reimbursement plan now simply a deferred benefits plan, so that
section 404 governs the deductibility of all reimbursed claims under
the plan? Perhaps instead the plan should be bifurcated, with those
claims for 1986 expenses paid by March 15, 1987, potentially deductible in 1986, and those claims paid after that date treated as
deferred benefits, deductible only upon payment. Although the answer is not totally clear under the temporary regulations, it appears
that bifurcation is appropriate. 159
The Supreme Court did mislead us. 160 Classification of a liability
as an "employee benefit liability" merely begins a complex analyGD honored late claims. See supra note 64.
Under such .circumstances it does not appear possible to rebut the presumption that the employer paid the benefits outside the "brief period." At the end
of 1986, it would have been foreseeable that such late payments were to be made.
See supra note 154.
' 59 Certainly a strong argument can be made that bifurcation is appropriate or
even that each employee should be treated as having his own "plan." The temporary regulations provide that "[b]enefits are 'deferred benefits' if, assuming the
benefits were cash compensation, such benefits would be considered deferred compensation." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(bHT, A~2(b)(l). And the regulations provide a relevant example of a cash arrangement that potentially results· in deferred
compensation but the status of which is determined employee-by-employee:
[S]alary or a year-end bonus received beyond the applicable 2-l/2
month· period by one employee shall be presumed to constitute payment under a· plan, or method or arrangement, deferring the receipt
of compensation for such employee even though salary or bonus payments to all other employees are not similarly treated because they
are received within the 2-1/2 month period.
/d.
In summary, the following table outlines the tax treatment for claims arising
from medical services provided in 1986:
Filing of Claim
Payment of Claim
Deductible
1986
Before 3/16/87
1986 (not a deferred
benefit)
1987 (upon payment)
After 3/15/87
1986
1987 (all events test not
Any time in 1987
1987
met until filing)
'"" The misled included the preparers of the Newsletter of the American Bar
157

158

.
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sis, an analysis full of uncertainties. Those uncertainties render the
Court's suggestion in General Dynamics particularly inappropriate.
The treatment of unfunded medical reimbursement plans under post1984 Act law should not have been discussed in the General Dynamics opinion. The Court prides itself on leaving issues not before
it for another day, and the Court demonstrated nothing but the
wisdom of its usual policy of restraint by offering its gratuitous
advice in this case.
IV.

THE INSURANCE COMPANY ANALOGY AND THE TREATMENT
OF ADDITIONS To RESERVES

A.

Generally
The briefs filed in General Dynamics devote a great deal of space
to sparring over the proper tax treatment of accounting reserves
created to meet future liabilities. 161 Despite the controversy, one
principle remains clear and undisputed: the fact that generally accepted financial accounting principles may dictate the creation of a
reserve in certain circumstances does not, by itself, justify a tax
deduction for additions to such a reserve. The Court in General
Dynamics reiterated that long-accepted principle. 162 To be currently
deductible, the liability must be established by facts occurring within
the taxable year, without regard to financial accounting treatnient.'63
Association's Section of Taxation. In reporting on the decision in General Dynamics, the Newsletter took the Court's suggestion about the time of economic
performance at face value. 6 A.B.A. SEc. TAX'N NEWSL. 62-63 (1987).
16
' Brief for the United States at 14-47, United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 107 S. Ct. 2092 {1987) (No. 85-1385); Brief for the Respondents at 39-43,
General Dynamics (No. 85-1385); Reply Brief for the United States at 8-9, General
Dynamics (No. 85-1385).
62
'
General Dynamics, 101 S. Ct. at 1737. "The prudent business man often
sets up reserves to cover contingent liabilities. But they are not allowable as
deductions." Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 452 (1930) (Brandeis,
J .) (footnote omitted).
63
'
Financial accounting and tax accounting serve different purposes. "The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful information to management,
shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested; the major responsibility of
the accountant is to protect these parties from being misled." Thor Power Tool
Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979). Financial accounting is thus conservative, tending to depress rather than inflate profits. See Jensen, supra note 3, at
475-76. In contrast, the Commissioner's interest is not well-served by using conservative principles to measure income subject to tax. Thor Power Tool, 439 U.S.
at 542.
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Thus, in the classic 1934 case, Brown v. Helvering, 164 the Court
held that an insurance agent's ''obligatipn" to refund a portion of
his eommission upon the cancellation of any policy was contingent
because of the possibility that no policies would be cancelled. Accordingly, the agent could not deduct the refund obligation prior
to the time of a cancellation, even though the agent could predict
future cancellations with a relatively high degree of statistical precision and establish an attuarially acceptable reserve to cover the
future liabilities.
Some Code provisions expressly permit accrual-basis taxpayers to
deduct additions to reserves without regard to the all events test. 165
If Congress was spycific about these deductions, should one infer
that Congress intended that othe:r, arguably similar· additions to
reserves not be deductible? The General Dynamics Court thought
so; it found particularly relevant the Code provisions governing the
taxation of certain insurance companies. 166 Sections 832(b)(5) 167 and

164
291 U.S. 193 (1934). The Supreme Court cited Brown approvingly in both
Hughes Properties and General Dynamics, United States v. Hughes Properties,
Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 602 (1986); General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1736-37.
'"' See, e.g., LR.C. § · 585, as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, § 90l(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2375-78 (permitting deductioi;J. for reasonable
addition to reserves for !:>ad debts of small banks, despite' general rule of I.R.C.
§ 166(a) permitting dedqction for bad debts only at time of full or partial worthlessness); see also I.R.C. § 461(h)(5)(C), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 805(c)(5), 100 Stat. 2085, 2362 (economic performance rule
not to apply to Code sections specifically providing for deductions for reserves ·
for estimated expenses); I.R.C. § 463(a), prior to repeal by Revenue Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 1020l(a), 101 Stat. 1330~382, 1330-387 (permitting deduction for "reasonable addition to an account representing the taxpayer's liability
for vacation pay earned before the end of the taxable year and paid during the
taxable year or within 8-112 months following the close of the taxable year,"
specifically including "amounts which, because of contingencies, would not (but
for this section) be deductible under section 162(a) as an accrued expense").
66
'
In the years in issue, sections 831 through 835 (then part III of Subchapter
L) generally applied to every insurance company other than life and mutual inc
surance companies. See I.R.C. § 831 (1982), prior to amendment by Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1024(a)(4), 100 Stat. 2085, 2405-06.
167
Prior to amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, see infra note 169,
LR.C. § 832(b)(5) provided, in general, that "losses incurred" on insurance contracts is computed as follows:
(A) to losses paid during the taxable year, add salvage and reinsurance recoverable outstanding at the end of the preceding taxable year
and deduct salvage· and reinsurance recoverable outstanding at the end
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832(c)(4), 168 as then in effect, 169 allowed non-life insurance
companies 170 to deduct "incurred but not reported" (IBNR) claims,
claims precisely like those at issue in General Dynamics. 171 But GD
was not an insurance company, 172 and the Court concluded that,
"[i]f the 'all events' test permitted the deduction of an estimated
reserve representing claims that were acttiarially likely but not yet
reported, Congress would not have needed to maintain an explicit
provision that insurance companies couid deduct such reserves." 173

of the taxable year.
(B) to the result so obtained, add all unpaid losses outstanding at
the end of the taxable year and deduct unpaid losses outstanding at
the end of the preceding taxable year.
·
!.R.C. § 832(b)(5) (1982).
168
Section 832(c)(4), unamended by subsequent legislation, permits an insurance
company other than a life insurance company to deduct, among other things,
"losses incurred," as defined in I.R.C. § 832(b)(5), in computing its taxable
income.
169
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 amended LR.C. § 832(b)(5) to limit an insurance company's deduction for future unpaid losses to the discounted present value
of such losses. I.R.C. § 832(b)(5), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, § 1022(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2397-99; see also I.R.C. § 846, as added
by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-514, § 1023(c), 100 Stat. 2085,
2399-2404 (defining "discounted unpaid losses").
110
"Non-life insu.rance company" is .an inartful term used here to refer to an
insurance company that is not a life insurance company. It is not intended to
suggest the policies available from participants in organized crime.
171 Taxpayers that are not insurance companies may not rely on the insurance
company deduction principles even if the claimed deductions are conceptually
identical to those allowed such companies. See Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193,
201 (1934) (''The simple answer [to a taxpayer argument based on insurance
company principles] is that the [taxpayer] is not an insurance company"). But the
Supreme Court's statement in Brown wa.S directed at a reserve for events that
had not yet occurred (the cancellation of policies), see supra text accompanying
note 164; the additions could not be deducted because the all events test had not
been met. In contrast, GD's claimed deduction related to events that had already
occurred. The deduction was claimed not because the deduction was like that
available to insurance companies, but because the all events test had arguably
been satisfied.
172
In fact, the two insurance companies from which GD took over the insurance
function had been properly deducting amounts reflecting IBNR claims. United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 n.6 (1987) (citing General
Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 250, 252 (1984)).
"Self-insurance" is not insurance, as that term is generally understood, because
self-insurance does not involve risk-shifting. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 577 F.2d 279, 280 {5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 546 (1979); supra
note 36.
m General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1737 (footnote omitted).
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Two related points may be encompassed by the Court's language.
First, the Court unquestionably determined that insurance company
tax rules are relevant to the consideration of self-insurance reserves
created by non-insurance companies. Second, General Dynamics may
also be read as addressing a more general issue, the deductibility
of any additions to reserves absent specific statutory authority. 174
The Court quite properly did not state that such additions are
necessarily not deductible. The opinion's misguided references to
insurance company taxation, however, and the Court's failure to
specifically repudiate the government's broad arguments on this
issue, unnecessarily add to the existing confusion in this area.

B.

The Relevance of Insurance Company Taxation

Insurance company taxation is a highly specialized field. In most
respects, Subchapter L of the Internal Revenue Code is a selfcontained body of law. 175 Accordingly, inferences and analogies from
Subchapter L should be drawn only with care, supported by an
examination of the purpose and history of the insurance company
provisions. The reader of General Dynamics, however, searches in
vain for a discussion of the legislative history of the relevant insurance tax provisions. The Court does not point to a single passage that discusses the peculiar problem of deductions for additions
to insurance company reserves to cover IBNR claims, yet it con-

If specific statutory authority exists, the taxpayer clearly does not need to
be concerned about the all events test and economic performance. See I.R.C. §
46l(h)(5), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §
805(c)(5), 100 Stat. 2085, 2362, and Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203,
§ 10201(b)(5), 101 Stat. 1330-382, 1330-387.
175
For a history of insurance company (particularly life insurance company)
taxation, see Alinco Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 336, 345-48 (Ct. Cl.
1967). The difficulty in measuring an insurance company's income under principles
applicable to other taxpayers arises because much of what an insurance company
receives in premiums is actuarially, and statutorily, committed to cover valid claims.
See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 58, 77 (1971), acq. in result
1973-2 C.B. L In this respect, Hughes' tax situation was analogous to the insurance company model: how (and when) is Hughes' taxable income measured when
much of what Hughes received it was required to pay qut? See United States v.
Hughes Properties Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 606 ("[Hughes'] true income from its
progressive slot machines is only that portion of the money gambled which it is
entitled to keep"); see also W. KLEIN, B. BITTKER & L. STONE, supra note 119,
at 437 (suggesting that Hughes Properties could be analyzed as a timing of income
inclusion case rather than as a deduction case).
174
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eludes that the insurance tax provisions are relevant to consideration of self-insurance reserves created by non-insurance companies.
Perhaps Congress enacted sections 832(b)(5) and 832(c)(4) for
reasons other than those suggested by the General Dynamics Court.
A more limited inference can certainly be drawn from the structure
and history of the Code. In 1972, the year in issue, the Code
required ·that life insurance companies employ an accrual method
of accounting.l76 The Code sections dealing with other insurance
companies contained no such mandate. One group of commentators
concluded that "[t]he formula for deducting property and liability
company losses incurred demonstrates that they operate under a
hybrid method of accounting" 177-a method of accounting that is
in part, but only in part, an accrual method.
The statutory starting point for computing "gross income" for
non-life insurance companies is the "annual statement approved by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners." 178 Deviations from annual statement principles are few; no judicial decision
"stands for the proposition that general provisions appearing elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code may be used to modify the
Annual Statement method of computing underwriting income." 179
So understood, sections 832(b)(5) and 832(c)(4) provide guidance
not about the usual rules governing accrual methods of accounting,
but about a method of tax accounting that is sui generis. As the
Tax Court concluded in Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Commissioner, 180 the all events test is "inconsistent with tax accrual rules
applicable to commerce generally." 181 Thus, insurers have been held
not to be bound by the all events test. 182

176
LR.C. § 818(a) (1982), prior to amendment by Tax Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L No. 98-369, § 2ll(a), 98 Stat. 494, 752. The principle is now included
in I.R.C. § 81l(a).
177
G. LENRow, R. MILo & A. RuA, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION oF INSURANCE
CoMPANIES 175 (3d ed. 1979). The Code permits hybrid methods of accounting,
methods that contain aspects of both cash and accrual accounting. See I.R.C. §§
446(c)(3), 446(c)(4).
178
I.R.C. § 832(b)(1)(A).
·~,Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 58, 80 (1971), acq. in result
1973-2 C.B. 1; see also Rev. Rut 73-302, 1973-2 C.B. 220 (discussing rationale
for acquies<;ence).
·
180 57 T.C. 58 (1971), acq. in result 1973-2 C.B. 1.
..; Id. at 78.
·
182
Id. at 77 ("The deduction of these loss . . . items is fundamentally at odds

274

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:229

Of course, to conclude, as the Tax Court did, that insurance
companies are not bound by the all events test does not prove thai
the Supreme Court's inference in General Dynamics is. wrong.. An
argument can be marshalled-and the government implicitly tnade
the argument in its opening brief in General Dynamics183-that the
language of Bituminous Casualty Corp. supports the Court's inference. The argument takes the following form: Accrual-basis taxpayers, including insurance companies, are generally bound by the
all events test. Because Congress decided that insurance companies
should take deductions for IBNR claims, although those claims are
inconsistent with the test, it made special statutory provision for
the only class of accrual-basis taxpayer permitted to take such deductions.184
That reading of Bituminous Casualty Corp., however, is supportable only if sections 832(b)(5) and 832(c)(4) are directed specifically at IBNR claims and at nothing else. Even assuming
arguendo that the sections would not exist if insurance companies
could take only those deductions available to accrual-basis taxpayers generally and that insurance companies may properly deduct
IBNR claims, 185 it does not follow that deductions for IBNR claims
are unavailable to other accrual-basis taxpayers.

with the 'all events' test"); id. at 82 n.2 (Rev. Rul. 67-225, 1967-2 C .. B. 238, is
wrong because "it seeks to apply an 'all events' test to insurance liabilities in a
manner inconsistent with the intent of Congress, the Treasury regulations, and
established industry practice"); see G. LENROW, R. Mrw & A. RuA, supra note
177, at 62.
183
Brief for United States at 30-31, United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
107 S. Ct. 1732 (1987) (No. 85-1385).
184
It was argued that insurance companies may deduct liabilities meeting the all
events test plus. other liabilities, and the IBNR claims were in the latter category.
Cf. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 51 T.C. at 83 (Commissioner's position would, without authority, "construe the word 'liability' ... as including only items which
satisfy the 'all events' test"); see also id. at 85 ("it is specifically contemplated
that deductions are allowable for dividends which have not accrued under the 'all
events' test'').
185
Perhaps we should further assume that it makes sense to try to determine
congressional intent associated with one technical tax concept (incomprehensible
to most members of Congress.) by reference to another, equally incomprehensible
technical provision hidden in the massive Internal Revenue Code.

1988]

TIMING OF DEDUCTIONS

275

The. two sections permit insurance companies to deduct amounts
that could not meet the a]]; events test under any ·reading, ' 86 such
aS COntested (and unpaid) fiabilities187 and Certain liabilitieS attribUtable tb events that will occur in .the future/ 88 Thus, sections
832(b)(5) and 832(c)(4) have purpos.es not necessariLy limited to the
type of IBNR claims at issue in General Dynamics. PerhapS' those
IBNR claims belong in the category of liabilities deductible by
insurance companies but not .by others. and the Supreme Court
summarily came to that conclusion. But neither statutory language
nor logic requires that result. Insurance companies may deduct ad~
ditions to IBNR reserves, and insurance companies may deduct
liabilities that do not meet the all events test, but those two c:ate~
gories are not necessarily coextensive.189
The Court, quite simply, was wrong in inferring from section
832 that only insurance companies may deduct additions to reserves
for IBNR claims. The extent of the Court.'s error is even more

fTlhe maj.or deductions from income are "losses'' and "loss adjustment expenses," which are . . . estimated amounts, The deductioll .
of these loss and loss adjustment expense items is fundamentally at
odds with the "aH events" test: The items include amounts for lia~
bilities which. are not established, but, on the contrary, vigorously
contested;. they include • . . expenses which wm not only be paid in
the future, but which are attributable to events which will not even
occur until the future. including future overhead; and they are so
unsusceptible of accurate estimate . . . .
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Comm'r, 57 T ..C. 58, 17-78 0981), acq. in result 197372 C.B.. 1.
m When a taxpayer contests a liability, the contest creates the contingency that
negates the fact of liability. See: Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445
(193.0). The Code now provides limited relief for taxpayers with contested liabilities. A contested liability may be deducted by an accrual-basis taxpayer prior to
resolution of the. contest if the liability would otherwise be deductible and the
taxpayer has actually paid the liability. I.R..C. § 461(f). If the liability has been
paid, there is no interval between accrual and payment and hence no premature
accruaL See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
1
"" See supr.a note 186.
••• Insurance companies may deduct (l) liabilities satisfying the all events test,
and (2) other liabilities that do not satisfy the all events test. One cannot infer
from the statutory scheme-and from knowing that IBNR claims are deductiblein which of the two categories. IBNR claims fit. One also cannot infer· that all of
the items classified as "IBNR claims" necessarily fit within only one of the two
categories.
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apparent upon a reexamination of one of the analytical concessions
made earlier. We had assumed arguendo that sections 832(b)(5) and
832(c)(4) would not exist if insurance companies could take only
those deductions available to accrual-basis taxpayers generally. 190
That assumption, however, is inconsistent with the Court's resolution of General Dynamics.
Insurance companies may deduct amounts attributable to "unpaid losses, " 191 and that statutory category (as its name suggests)
includes losses for claims that have already been filed. Because
Congress expressly permitted insurance· companies to deduct amounts
relating to filed but unpaid claims, would the Court have us infer
that no other taxpayers may take such deductions? The Court itself
drew no such inference; it concluded that GD's failure with respect
to filed but unpaid claims was not that such claims are deductible
only to insurance companies, but that GD had not created the
record to justify its deduction. 192 If GD had provided the data, it
would have been entitled to a deduction, ·just like an insurance
,company. Whatever virtues the opinion in General Dynamics has,
internal consistency is not among them.

C.

The Relevance of Other Reserve Provisions

The Supreme Court in General Dynamics made one mistake in
concluding that specific insurance company tax provisions were relevant to non-insurance companies. That error is, however, a narrow
one. A more important concern is that General Dynamics may be
read uncritically to stand for the broader principle that additions
to reserves are deductible under the all events test only when permitted by specific statutory authority.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as enacted, contained a
provision, section 462, that expressly permitted an accrual-basis taxpayer to deduct "reasonable additions" to reserves for estimated
expenses related to a trade or business. Congress added section 462
and a companion provision permitting deferral of prepayments received by accrual-basis taxpayers (section 452)1 93 in an express at-

190
191

192

See supra text accompanying note 185.
See supra note 1()7.
See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1987);

supra .notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
193

For an accrual-basis taxpayer, time of receipt is ordinarily not controlling
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tempt to harmonize tax accounting and financial accounting. 194
Within a year of enactment, however, Congress repealed both sections retroactively .195
Congress intended the repeal of section 462 to deny taxpayers
some deductions that otherwise would have been available on an
accelerated basis under. the short-lived statute. The legislative history clearly evidences concern on the part of Congress and the
Treasury about the effect of the section on the revenue. 196 But does
the repeal mean that additions to any reserves are deductible only
with express statutory authority? The government in General Dynamics so argued. In fact, the government's argument in its opening brief went far beyond what was necessary to resolve the case
in its favor . 197 In addition, the Tax Court has concluded 1 in light

for purposes of determining time of income inclusion. However, in three cases
decided after the repeal of I.R.C. § 452 (1954), the Supreme Court concluded
that payments received before the amounts have been earned must generally be
included in income at the time of receipt. This result follows even though it is
inconsistent with the generally accepted financial accounting principles described
in note 13 supra. See Schlude v. Comm'r, 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (prepayments for
dancing lessons); American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961)
(prepayments of membership dues); Automobile Club v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180
(1957) (prepayments of membership dues); see also Malman, Treatment of Prepaid
Income -- Clefir Reflection of Income or Muddied Waters, 37 TAX. L. REv. 103,
105 (1981).
.
.
194
H.R. REP. No. 293,. 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1955), reprinted in 1955-~
C.B. 852, 853-55 [hereinafter 1955 House Report, with page citations to the Cu. mulative Bulletin]; S. REP .. No. 372, 84th Cong.; 1st Sess: 3~6, reprinted in 19552 C.B. 858, 859~60 [hereinafter 1955 Senate Report, with page citations to the
·
·
Cumulative Bulletin].
19' Ch, 143, §§ l(a)-(b), 69 Stat. 134, l34 (1955).
96
'
American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 695 (1961); 1955
House Report, supra note 194; at 853-55; 1955 Senate Report, supra note 194, at
859-60; Prepaid Income and Reserves for Estimated Expenses: Hearings on H.R.
4725 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1955) (statement of Treasury Secretary Humphrey).
197
See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 21, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732 (1987) {No. 85-1385):
Congress thus has specifically considered and, upon reconsideration,
rescinded a provision that would have allowed tax deductions for reserves established in accordance with generally accepted financial accounting principles. And there can be no doubt that the . . . reserve
for which [GDJ seeks a deduction here is precisely the sort of reserve
that Congress had in mind in 1954. The Claims Court ... recognized
that it was an ordinary reserve. . . . Indeed, the IBNR account was
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of the repeal, that. there are few circumstances under which additions to reserves •• for liabilities to be incurred in the future" should
be deductible:
The repeal . . . removed the only provision providing, in
general, for the deduction of estimates of expenses to be
incurred in the future. ·While prudent accounting or financial practices may dictate the establishment of reserves
. . .• {such] reserves are not ordinarily deductible. 198
On the other hand, section 462 expressly applied only to items
for which no other statutory basis for deduction existed~ 199 Additions to reserves that would have been deductible under other principles should have remained deductible after the repeal. 200 Additions

literally taken .off the books of the insurance companies, where it was
indubitably a reserve, and placed upon [GD's] own books..
It may well be that this ex13ansive language, which suggests that char.acterization
as a reserve necessarily destrnys deductibility, was intended not as an accurate
description of theory, but as part of the expected excesses .of advocacy. In its
Reply Brief, the .goverrunent Jetreated somewhat and agreed that taxpayers may
deduct additions to reserves representing already accrued expenses. Reply Brief for
the United States at 9, Gen:erol Dynamics (No ..85-1385).
1' 8 World Airways., In~. v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 786, 801 (1974). See Simplified
Tax Records, Inc. v. Comm'cr, 41 T.C. 75, 81 n.6 (1963) {repeal of § 462 indicates
that Commissioner's. discretion in disallowing deduction will be disturbed·. only if
''clear abnse''). Cf. American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 69596 (1961) (repeal.of § 452 demonstrates congressional disapproval of deferral of
prepayments: "the cold fact is that [Congress] repealed the only law incontestably
permitting the practice upon which the [taxpayer attempting to defer the inclusion
of already received income] depeRds"). The Tax Court has expressed its concern
that ex.cessively loose construction of the all events test would result in the judicial
"reenactment" of the repealed § 462. Ohio River Conieries Co. v. Comm'r, 77
T.C 1369. 1377-78 (1981).
' 99 The statute generally permitted. the deduction of "a reasonable addition :to
ead.1 reserve for estimated expenses." LR.C. § 462(a) (1954). Included in the
definition of "estimated expenses" was a requirement that the deduction be one
"part or ail of which would (but for this section) be required to be taken into
account for a subsequent taxable year." I.R.C. § 462(d)(l)(A) {1954}. The deduction was also required to be one "attributable to the income of the taxable year
or prior :taxable years for which an election under II.R.C. § 462] is in effect; and
. . . which the Secretary . . . is satisfied can be estimated with reasonable accuracy!' LR.C. §§ 462(d)(i)(B), 462(d)(l)tC) {1954).
200
See Kaiser Steel Corp. v.. United. States, 717 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1983)
(rejecting government's argument that estimates reflected. in additions to reserves
should never' be deductible); 1955 Senate Report, supra note 196, at 861 ("exten-
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to reserves for liabilities yet to be incurred may not be «ordinarily
deductible.,'' but the controlling question is whether the requirements of the all events test (now as modified by the economic
performance requirement) have been fulfilled. 201
If the requirements of the all events test are met (with or without
the economic performance requirement, as appropriate), then the
liability, by definition, is not one "to be incurred in the future."
The liability constitutes an "incurred" liability, hence deductible by
an accrual-basis taxpayer, even though it may be paid in a subsequent taxable year. If there had been any doubt on that point, the
Supreme Court seemed to resolve it in a Hughes Properties footnote by denying that any particular significance should be attached
to the repeal of sections 452 and 462. 202
The issue should never be whether a particular accounting mechanism creates a ''reserve" or not. In the Tax Court's words, "Simply using the term ['reserves'] to describe the deductions in issue
is insufficient. " 203 A "reserve" is merely an accounting entry, 204
and one may be established to cover expenses that are clearly deductible. For example, a reserve may be established to fund an
obligation to pay for deductible services that have already been
provided and for which the provider has made a claim for payment. In such a case, economic performance has occurred, and,
sion of principles [of Pacific Grape Prods. Co. v. Comm'r, 219 F.2d 862 (9th
Cir. 1955), described in Jensen, supra note 3, at 474] might weH lead the courts
in the future to permit the accrual of most estimated expenses which would be
covered by section 462 even though this section is repealed"); Aidinoff & Lopata,
supra note 3, at 810; Gunn, supra note 3, at 29; McGown, supra note 96, at
260; Stanger, Vander Kam, & Polifka, supra note 13, at 421. The Claims Court
opinion in General Dynamics is consistent: "We think that the 1954 enactment
and 1955 repeal of § 462 operates .[sic] to reestablish the 'all events' test as the
appropriate standard for ordinary taxpayers to meet." General Dynamics Corp.
v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 250, 256 n.2 (1984). See also Schlude v. Comm'r, 372
U.S. 128, 139-40 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (no inference of disapproval of
accrual accounting principles to be drawn from repeal of sections 452 and 462).
20
' See supra note 200.
202
"The fact that Congress once briefly adopted statutory provisions that specifically would have permitted a taxpayer to deduct anticipated expenses by a
reserve mechanism is hardly .significant." United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc.,
476 U.S. 593, 604 n.4 (1986).
'"' Buckeye Int'l, Inc. v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 376, 385 (1984).
204
See Geyer, Cornell & Newell, Inc. v. Comm'r, 6 LC. 96, 100 (1946), cited
in Brief for the United States at 16 n.2, United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
107 S. Ct. 1732 (1987) (No. 85-1385).
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barring a contest of the liability, the all events test has been satisfied.205 Deductibility does not turn on terminology. 205
It would have been helpful if the Court in General Dynamics
had put to rest the reserves issue by unequivocally repudiating the
government's broad language. Although the Court did not do so,
there should be no misunderstanding about its conclusion: if GD
had established the portion of the claimed deduction representing
additions to cover a "firmly established 10 liability (the claims already filed by the end of 1972), it would have been able to deduct
that portion, whether represented in a "reserve" or not. 207 That

20
' The example also 'assumes that no other statutory provision requires deferral
of the deduction.
·
2(16 Buckeye Int'l, Inc. v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 376, 385 (1984) ("Where
. . . the liability in question satisfies both requirements of the all events test,
accrual is proper despite the label used by [the Internal Revenue Service]").
207
General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1737. The Court concluded that
"[b}ecause the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that any of the deducted reserve
represented claims for which its liability was firmly established as of the close of
1972, all the events necessary to establish liability were not shown to have occurred, and therefore no deduction was permissible." I d.
The Court thus implicitly rejected the government's argument that the repeal of
I.R.C. § 462 had special significance for the self-insurance reserves at issue in
General Dynamics. The legislative history of I.R.C. § 462 included in the examples
of deductible items estimates of "certain liabilities for self-insured injury and
dainage claims." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A163 (1954), reprinted
in 1954 U.S. CoDE CoNo. & ADMIN. NEws 4017, 4301 [hereinafter 1954 House
Report, with page citations to USCCAN]; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
63, 305-07 (1954), reprinted in ·1954 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4621,
4946 [hereinafter 1954 Senate Report, with page citations to USCCAN]. In General
Dynamics, the government argued that these passages in the committee reports
evidenced
Congress's view ... that reserves for estimated expenses could not
have been accrued by ordinary taxpayers before the enactment of Section 462, and the calculated repeal of that Section was "a mandate
from the Congress" that an accounting method entailing such reserves
"was not acceptable for tax purposes."
Brief for the United States at 28, General Dynamics (No. 85-1385).
But all that is inferable from the legislative history is that, before the enactment
of I.R.C. § 462, there were some expenses associated with self-insured injury
claims that were not deductible before payment. The committee reports did not
separate. those items deductible only because of I.R.C. § 462 from those items
that would have been deductible without regard to the section. That separation
should have required application of the all events test. Cf. 1954 House Report,
supra, at 4074 (describing law before enactment of, and therefore presumably
after retroactive repeal of, I.R.C. § 462); 1954 Senate Report, supra, at 4695 (to
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was the law prior to General Dynamics. If it is not the law today,
it is because section 404 applies to such a situation, 208 not because
the taxpayer employs a reserve method of accounting.
CONCLUSION

[W]hile it is proper that people should find fault when
their judges fail, it is only reasonable that they should
recognize the difficulties. Perhaps it is also fair to ask
that before the judges are blamed they shall be given the ·
credit of having tried to do their best. Let them be severely brought to pook, when they go wrong, but by
those who will take the trouble to understand.-Learned
Hand209
The Supreme Court has heard many cases on the timing of
deductions, and in the last two terms the Court inexplicably decided
two more. Because of the changes made by the Tax Reform Act
of 1984, it is tempting to see Hughes Properties and General Dynamics simply as wasted effort. Even the surviving principles of
the all events test will have to be reevaluated in subsequent cases
in light of the economic performance requirement and other new
statutory provisions.
But characterizing the Court's written products as -yvasted effort
is too generous. In these two cases, the Court confused the application of the unmodified all events test, misled taxpayers about the

same effect).
For example, I.R.C. § 462, had it remained in effect, may have permitted the
deduction of additions to reserves reflecting injuries incurred without regard to
whether medical services had actually been provided in that same taxable year.
Certainly such an understanding is consistent with the cursory references unearthed
by the government in the legislative history. Without I.R.C. § 462, the all events
test would have treated the provision of medical care as a necessary "event" and
would have denied a deduction at least until such care had been provided. The
treatment of such reserves was irrelevant to GD's situation, however, because GD
took no deductions with respect to medical services to be provided in the future.
Cf. Crane, supra note 36, at 282 (General Dynamics different from most "selfinsurance" cases in that there was no attempt to estimate liabilities arising from
indeterminate facts that would occur only in future years).
21}• See supra notes 136-60 and accompanying text.
209 L. HAND, How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in THE SPIRIT
OF LIBERTY 110 (3d ed. 1960).
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analysis ·of employee benefit liabilities required by the Tax Reform
Act of 1984, and applied ill-conceived methods of statutory construction. It is difficult, particularly with the opinion in General
Dynamics, to discern any effort at all.
The Justices obviously do not view working on a tax case as a
pleasant way to spend a winter's day. Few people do. But the.
Court did not have to decide Hughes Properties and General Dynamics. It can pick the tax cases it hears, and in these cases strong
substantive reasons existed not to grant certiorari. As sympathetic
as we might be to the Court's lack of enthusiasm, once it decides
to proceed with a case, we may reasonably expect a serious effort.
Although Judge Hand's admonition is eminently fair as a general
matter, we would show the members of this Supreme Court little
respect if we were to conclude that, in Hughes Properties and
General Dynamics, they had done their best.

,

